Abortion and the European Convention on Human Rights

Dr. Grégor Puppinck∗

In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on a number of cases dealing with the issue of abortion, providing a sufficient corpus of jurisprudence which may be analysed in a consistent manner. A number of analysts, on both sides of the abortion debate, are not satisfied with this case-law. This article aims not to discuss each ruling of the Court case by case, but to try to find, in an objective and systematic manner, the coherency of the jurisprudence of the Court, and in doing so, to present a reasoned legal account of abortion under the Convention.

I – Introduction

The purpose of this article is to present in an objective, complete and coherent manner the status of abortion¹ under the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (Court) has ruled on a number of cases related to abortion. These rulings provide a sufficient corpus of jurisprudence which may be analysed in a consistent manner. A number of analysts, on both sides of the abortion debate, are not satisfied with this case-law. It is often said that it is hard to find coherency in the case-law of the Court when it touches upon sensitive matters. This article aims not to discuss each ruling of the Court, but to try to find the coherency of the jurisprudence of the Court, and in doing so, to present a reasoned legal account of abortion under the Convention.

∗ Grégor Puppinck holds his Ph.D. with a dissertation on medical law and bioethics. He graduated from the Law School of Paris II and from the “Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales”. From 2003 to 2009, he taught human rights, international law and constitutional law at the Law School of the University of Haute-Alsace, France. He is the Director of the European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg. He warmly thanks Ms. Andreea Popescu and Dr. Claire de La Hougue, lawyers, for their kind assistance and contribution to this study.

¹ This article does not deal with freedom of expression in the field of abortion, and makes some reference to the conscientious objection.
The debate on abortion is still very intense. The countries who have maintained restrictions on abortion have come under strong political pressure, not only internally, but also from a number of international organisations, including the Council of Europe.

In Europe, 30% of pregnancies end up in abortion. After more than thirty years of legal abortion in most European countries, it should be possible to begin addressing this practice in an objective manner; looking more to the practical experience than to the ideological implications of the massive practice of abortion. As a very recent example of such objective attitude, Lord David Steel, the architect of Britain’s liberal abortion laws, has said that he “never envisaged there would be so many abortions”. “All we knew was that hospitals up and down the land had patients admitted for septic, self-induced abortions and we had up to 50 women a year dying from them”. Now, he warns Ireland, whose government is executing the A. B. & C. v. Ireland judgment, that “it would be a mistake to try and legislate for abortion in categories such as suicide or rape”. It is no longer possible to talk about abortion only in terms of progress and liberation for women. For medical practitioners and lawmakers, the reality of abortion is less ideological and more complex.

The cases submitted to the Court reflect increasingly the variety and complexity of the situations related to abortion. Those cases are not limited to the abstract claim of a “right to access to abortion”, but concern various issues such as abortions on minors, eugenic abortion, consent and information of the different people concerned. For example, some women complain because they could not abort their handicapped child, while others complain for having undergone abortion without having been fully informed. A “potential father” complained unsuccessfully because his partner aborted his child while a potential grandmother successfully complained before the Court that her daughter could not obtain access to an abortion in satisfactory conditions.

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4 Ibid.
6 O’Doherty, supra note 3.
7 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 41-44.
One of the main difficulties for the Court is to determine how to legally handle the matter of abortion: how to introduce the practice of abortion within the internal logic of the Convention and of its case-law. Indeed, when the Convention was drafted, abortion was widely criminalised, because it was considered a direct violation of the right to life of the unborn child. Only abortion induced in order to save the life of the mother was possible. The central question was, and still is, whether or not the unborn child is a “person” within the meaning of Article 2. The Court keeps this question open in order to allow the States to determine when life begins, and therefore when legal protection starts.

Those who advocate a right to abortion defend the idea that within the Convention system, “Member States are free to determine the availability and legal status of abortion”.\(^8\) While it is true that States have the freedom not to legalise abortion, the Convention has something to say on the right to life of the unborn child and of his/her mother. At the very least, it should be widely accepted that Member States have a duty under the Convention to ban painful, late or forced abortions. Therefore, Member States are not totally free to determine the availability and legal status of abortion, but they have to take into account the different, legitimate interests and rights involved.

In cases where abortion is legal, the Court has established that its legal framework shall adequately take into account the different, legitimate interests involved. The Court has several times recalled that if and “once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations”,\(^9\) “the legal framework devised for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the

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This wording became the principle underpinning the regulation of abortion by the Court.

Therefore, when the national legislature has decided to legalise abortion, the Court assesses its legal framework by looking at whether a fair balance is struck between the various rights and interests involved in the issue. The Court has already identified a number of those rights and interests surrounding the status of abortion, such as the interests and rights of the mother, of the unborn child, of the father, of medical staff, of society, etc. This approach of balancing rights and interests implies that those of the pregnant woman may not always prevail.

Assessing the balance of interests and the proportionality of the decisions of public authorities is the usual method of analysis of the Court. However, a major difficulty with applying this method to abortion is that it is fundamentally not possible to balance someone’s life with someone else’s right or interest. Therefore, if the State recognises the unborn child as a person, you may only balance his/her life with the life of another person, that of the mother. It is not possible to balance on the one hand the compared value of the will of the mother and that of the life of the unborn child. Neither the value of a will nor of a human life can actually be estimated, let alone be compared to each other. It is therefore important to understand that the question of the status of the unborn child in national legislation takes precedence over the status of the “woman’s right” upon the life of her unborn child. Balancing the will of the mother against the life of the unborn amounts to evaluating the power of the woman over the life of her child. This explains why almost all the case-law of the Court on abortion concerns extreme cases, cases of abortions in the context of medical indications where the life or the health of the mother was at stake, rather than her pure will.

In the case of abortion on demand, (abortions which were not motivated by health reasons, but only by the will of the mother), the Court has never admitted that the autonomy of the woman could, per se, suffice to justify an abortion in terms of

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Convention requirements. Moreover, the Court explicitly excluded this ground when it declared that Article 8, which protects individual personal autonomy, does not contain any right to abortion. Abortion on demand harms the unborn child without any proportionate motive. As this study will conclude, the legal arguments supporting the conventionality of carrying out an abortion on demand are very weak or even inexistent.

In a broader perspective, this article will look at the massive practice of abortion on demand as a result of a systematic failure by States to fulfil their obligations in regard to socio-economic rights. Indeed, most abortions are requested because of socio-economic constraints of the mother and family. This constraint and the resulting high number of abortions could be limited if States endeavoured to really fulfil their socio-economic obligations, according to which “special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth” and that “the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society”.11 The fulfilment by States of their socio-economic obligations would go a long way towards helping women in crisis pregnancy, and towards the implementation of a forgotten right: the “right not to abort”.

In the present article, the analysis of the status of abortion under the Convention and case-law will reveal the following reasoning:

1. The Convention does not exclude prenatal life from its scope of protection and the Court has never excluded prenatal life from its field of application;

2. The Convention does not contain, nor create a right to abortion;

3. In most European national legislation, abortion is a derogation to the protection granted in principle to the life of the unborn;

4. If the State allows abortion in its national legislation, it remains subject, under the Convention, to an obligation to protect and respect competing rights and interests; those rights and interests weigh on both sides of the balance in restricting the scope of the derogation as well as in supporting it;

11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 10, paras. 1 and 2.
5. Finally, this article observes that abortion on demand is a “blind spot” in the case-law of the Court and draws the conclusion that this practice violates the Convention, because it harms interests and rights guaranteed by it without any proportionate justification.

II – Neither the Convention, nor other European or international human rights instruments exclude prenatal life from their scope of protection

The “principle of sanctity of life”12 is “protected under the Convention”13 and recognised by the European Court, which affirms that “the right to life is an inalienable attribute of the human beings and forms the supreme value in the hierarchy of human rights”.14 International human rights instruments recognise life as a primary right.15 The right to life is the first to be guaranteed in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights: “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”,16 but also in other instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights17 or the European Convention on Human Rights18 which provides that: “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law”.19 Life is a public interest, and not

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13 Ibid. at para. 65.
17 Article 6 of the International Covenant.
18 Article 2 of the Convention.
19 According to the Convention:
just a private interest, which explains why it is particularly protected by criminal law rather than civil law: any violation of life is not only a violation of the private interests of the victim, but also damages the common good of society, including the public order. In this sense, as the Court has recognised: “pregnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life”,\textsuperscript{20} it does not only concern the private life of the mother. The minimum standard established by the former European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission), with regard to abortion and the legal protection of the prenatal life, states that: “[t]here can be no doubt that certain interests relating to pregnancy are legally protected”.\textsuperscript{21}

The case-law of the Court does not exclude the unborn child from the scope of the protection of the Convention.\textsuperscript{22} This is true not only with regard to Article 2, but also with regard to other provisions of the Convention, as well as other norms enshrined in other European and international human rights instruments.

A. With regard to Article 2 of the Convention

The Court says that “Article 2 of the Convention is silent as to the temporal limitations of the right to life”.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, it protects “everyone”\textsuperscript{24} without any limitation or

1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a Court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
   (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
   (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
   (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.} at para. 60.
\textsuperscript{22} Even the legal advisors of the \textit{Centre for Reproductive Rights}, which is the leading legal organisation promoting a right to abortion on demand, recognising this fact. See Zampas & Gher, \textit{supra} note 8 at 265, 276.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Vo v. France}, [G.C.], no. 53924/00, 8 July 2004 at para. 75 [hereinafter \textit{Vo v. France}]
\textsuperscript{24} This is confirmed by the Consultative Assembly’s preparatory work in 1949, which clearly shows that these are rights that one enjoys just because one exists: “the Committee of Ministers has asked us to establish a list of rights which man, as a human being, would naturally enjoy” Preparatory work, vol. II, p. 89.
reduction of the temporal scope of the right to life. This is normal, as life is a material reality before becoming an individual right. Life either exists or does not. It is a fact that everyone's life is a continuum that begins at conception and advances in stages until death.\textsuperscript{25}

Determining the limits of physical life is not difficult. However, the development of practices such as \textit{in vitro} fertilisation, abortion and euthanasia, have impaired the manner in which physical life itself and its legal protection can coincide in time. The right detaches itself from its object, thus becoming something abstract. We move from a realistic or an objective definition of the \textit{right} to a more abstract and subjective one. The temporal application of the right is not determined by its cause but by an external will. Since the legalisation of these practices, the right to life does not necessarily protect life fully anymore (life that is considered as an objective reality), but only a part of life, the extent of which varies according to the will of individuals within the framework established by the national legislatures.

When the Convention was drafted, there was a broad consensus on the criminal nature of “abortion on demand”.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, the Court itself has never redefined, so as to reduce, the scope of Article 2: the Court has never excluded prenatal life from its field of application.\textsuperscript{27} In \textit{H. v. Norway}, the Commission found “that it does not have to decide

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25}\textit{See, e.g.}, T.W. Sadler, \textit{Langman’s Medical Embryology}, 7\textsuperscript{th} edition. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins 1995) at 3 noting that “the development of a human begins with fertilization, a process by which the spermatozoon from the male and the ovocyte from the female unite to give rise to a new organism”; see also K. L. Moore & T.V.N. Persaud, \textit{The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology}, 7\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Philadelphia: Saunders, 2003) at 2, noting that “the union of an ovocyte and a sperm during fertilization” marks “the beginning of the new human being.”
\item \textsuperscript{26}\textit{See Brüggemann & Scheuten supra note 20 at para. 64:}
\item \textsuperscript{27}As President Jean-Paul Costa explained in his Separate Opinion under \textit{Vo v. France}, supra note 23 at para. 11, “[h]ad Article 2 been considered to be entirely inapplicable, there would have been no point –
whether the foetus may enjoy a certain protection under Article 2, first sentence as interpreted above, but it will not exclude that in certain circumstances this may be the case notwithstanding that there is in the Contracting States a considerable divergence of views on whether or to what extent Article 2 protects the unborn life.”

This position has been consistently upheld by the Court.

Similarly, the Court has never construed Article 2 so as to allow an implicit exception to the right to life regarding prenatal life; “it would be at variance with both the letter and the spirit of that Article. Firstly, the permissible exceptions formed an exhaustive list. Secondly, the exceptions were to be understood and construed strictly”. More subtly, the Court has in practice permitted States to exclude the unborn from the protection conferred by Article 2, leaving the determination of the scope of this Article in their margin of appreciation, “so that it would be equally legitimate for a State to choose to consider the unborn to be such a person and to aim to protect that life”. In this way, the Court did not engage itself in the legally impossible creation of a new implicit derogation of Article 2 § 2, nor did it exclude the unborn child from protection under the Convention.

In fact, the Court preferred to avoid judging and deciding on the conventionality of abortion in principle. This was too sensitive and still is to a large extent. All applications brought by opponents of the legalisation of abortion have been deemed

and this applies to the present case also – in examining the question of foetal protection and the possible violation of Article 2, or in using this reasoning to find that there had been no violation of that provision.”.


29 See inter multis: Brüggemann & Scheuten supra note 20 at para. 60; Vo v. France supra note 23 at para. 78.

30 “[Article 2] sets out the limited circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified” (see Pretty supra note 12 at para. 37).

31 See Öcalan v. Turkey, no. 46221/99, 12 March 2003 at paras. 54 and 201 (abstract from the portion of the ruling dedicated to the presentation of the position of the French government).

32 Vo v. France supra note 23 at para. 82: “[it] follows that the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere (…))”.

33 A., B. & C. supra note 5 at para. 222.
inadmissible for lack of *locus standi*, because they were not personally a victim of the legalisation of abortion.\(^{34}\)

However, when the Court was called to judge cases where the conventionality of abortion was not directly challenged, the Court has applied the right to life of the unborn child in those cases. For example, in *Reeve v. The United Kingdom*,\(^ {35}\) the Commission found it “reasonably proportionate” that British law does not allow an action for “wrongful life”, because it “pursues the aim of upholding the right to life”. The Court noticed that the British “law is based on the premise that a doctor cannot be considered as being under a duty to the foetus to terminate it and that any claim of such a kind would be contrary to public policy as violating the sanctity of human life”.\(^ {36}\)

Although in *Vo v. France* the Grand Chamber maintained its conviction “that it is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention”,\(^ {37}\) it partially answered the issue raised by the applicant. Indeed, it affirmed that: “it may be regarded as common ground between States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race”\(^ {38}\) and that he/she “require[es] protection in the name of human dignity”.\(^ {39}\) This principle affords protection to the unborn child against violations of his/her dignity, such as inhuman or degrading treatment, which the Court cannot tolerate due to the absolute prohibition of such treatment under the Convention. This principle could also be applied, for example, to practices of late or sex-selective abortions, or when it can be proven that the abortion provokes foetal pain.\(^ {40}\)

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\(^{34}\) See *Borre Arnold Knudsen v. Norway*, no. 11045/84, Decision of 8 March 1985 on the admissibility of the application; *X. v. Austria*, no. 7045/75, decision of the former Commission of 10 December 1976 on the admissibility. According to this case-law, the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to examine *in abstracto* its compatibility with the Convention.

\(^{35}\) *Reeve*, supra note 12.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) *Vo v. France*, supra note 23 at para. 85.

\(^{38}\) Ibid. at para. 84.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

in this way, the Court has followed the line drawn by the former Commission\textsuperscript{41} which did not exclude the unborn child from the protection afforded by the right to life.

As a general rule, the Convention should be interpreted in the light of the aim for which it was created, namely to provide further protection of human rights, especially to the vulnerable. Excluding prenatal life from its scope as a matter of principle would go against the aim of the Convention.

B. With regard to other provisions of the Convention

The Court has recognised the applicability of other provisions of the Convention to prenatal life in several cases. In the case of \textit{H. v. Norway},\textsuperscript{42} a complaint was made under Article 3 of the Convention by the father of an aborted child arguing that no measure had been taken to avoid the risk of pain of the fourteen week old foetus during the abortion. On this occasion, the former Commission accepted the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention to the unborn child, and only then considered the complaint ill-founded, for lack of evidence of foetal pain: “the Commission has not been presented with any material which could substantiate the applicant’s allegations of pain inflicted upon the fetus … having regard to the abortion procedure as described therein the Commission does not find that the case discloses any appearance of a violation of Article 3”. This means that if the abortion circumstances had been different, such as, for example, in the case of a late abortion, the complaint could have been well founded.

In \textit{X. v. The United Kingdom},\textsuperscript{43} the Commission considered that the father of an aborted foetus could be regarded as the “victim” of a violation of the right to life, and affirmed that the term “everyone” also concerns the foetus, as he/she “cannot be

\textsuperscript{41} The Commission did not exclude the unborn child from the protection of the right to life, it indicated that it was not necessary to decide this question (\textit{H. v. Norway}, supra note 28 \textit{Bruggemann & Scheuten supra note 20}; \textit{X. v. The United-Kingdom}, no. 8416/79, in December of the previous Commission May 13, 1980 at para. 7, [hereinafter \textit{X. v. United Kingdom}]; \textit{Reeve, supra note 12, Boso v. Italy, supra note 20} and had referred the matter at the discretion of Member States (\textit{H. v. Norway} and \textit{Boso v. Italy}).

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{H. v. Norway, supra note 28}.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{X. v. The United-Kingdom, supra note 41}.
excluded”, 44 from the protection afforded by Article 6§ 1. 45 Similarly, the foetus may also enjoy protection within the framework of Article 8 § 2, 46 even if the Court “does not... consider it necessary to determine... whether the term “others” in Article 8 § 2 extends to the unborn”. 47 In the end, the Convention and the case-law of the Court demonstrate that the unborn is not excluded from the scope of the Convention.

Thus, States like Ireland, Malta, Poland or San Marino that uphold the entire scope of Article 2, recognising their responsibility to protect life from conception, can invoke this treaty provision guaranteeing the right to life as encompassing the State's responsibility to protect the unborn child from abortion. These States fully respect their obligations, beyond the minimum threshold currently required by the Court, pursuant to Article 53 of the Convention, 48 which establishes that the State is free to provide wider protection of human rights than the one guaranteed by the Convention. Thus, the means used by those States to protect life (especially the prohibition of abortion, and the adoption of positive measures aiming to support the welcoming of life) contribute to the achievement of voluntary obligations consented to by the State, in accordance with Articles 2 and 53 of the Convention.

C. With regard to other norms enshrined in European and international human rights instruments

Other provisions of European and international human rights instruments also offer protection to the unborn child referring to his/her various stages of development (e.g. embryo and foetus). Many European human rights instruments relating to bioethics contain provisions on prenatal life, such as the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research. These legal instruments

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44 Ibid. at para. 7.
45 For another example of such an application in connection with access to a Court, see Reeve, supra note 12 at 146.
47 A., B. & C., supra note 5 at para. 228.
48 Article 53 of the Convention reads as follows: “[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.”
are unwilling to define the “human being” and whether the term “everyone” still applies to the embryo and prenatal life, in order to provide them protection. In that sense, the Court has noticed that “the embryo and/or foetus ... are beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation”\(^{49}\)

As the Court stressed many times, the Convention has to be interpreted in an evolutive manner, “in the light of present-day conditions”.\(^{50}\) The interpretation of the Convention should take into account, \textit{inter alia}, the more recent legal instruments protecting human dignity and the embryo, as well as the evolution of scientific knowledge and practices. The consideration of scientific progress should not be limited only to the field of biotechnologies, but should also include the progress in prenatal and neonatal medicine which has considerably improved the viability threshold of the foetus as a patient\(^{51}\) and permitted a better knowledge of the suffering endured by the foetus during the abortion process. The regulation of abortion should be affected by this evolution.

In the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) judgment of 18 October 2011, in the case of \textit{Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V.}\(^{52}\) the Grand Chamber of the E.C.J., interpreting E.U. Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, ruled that the embryo enjoys protection from the stage of fertilisation against patenting, when the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos. The principle of dignity and integrity of the person\(^{53}\) protects the human embryo and the cells derived from it at any stage of its formation or development. The E.C.J. has defined the “human embryo” as “any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into

\(^{49}\) \textit{Vo v. France, supra} note 23 at para. 84.
\(^{50}\) See \textit{Tyrer v. The United Kingdom}, Judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26 at para. 31 and subsequent case-law.
\(^{52}\) European Court of Justice, \textit{Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V.}, 18 October 2011, C-34/10.
\(^{53}\) Recital (16) Whereas patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person; whereas it is important to assert the principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented; whereas these principles are in line with the criteria of patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented.
which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted, and any non-
fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by
parthenogenesis”. This is the first decision of a European Court which provides a
definition of the human embryo. The Court specified that this definition is “an
autonomous concept of European Union law”. This means that in relation to European
Union law, the meaning and scope of the term “human embryo” must be given a uniform
and independent interpretation throughout the European Union. The Member States
are no longer free to choose their own definition of the “human embryo” when applying
the Directive. Within the framework of the E.C.J., it does not belong to the national
margin of appreciation to determine what an embryo is and when the human embryo
deserves legal protection in regard to human dignity and integrity. Such an autonomous
definition is necessary in order to permit a uniform interpretation and implementation
of the Directive throughout the European Union. Consequently, the assessment of the
Convention according to which “there is no European consensus on the scientific and
legal definition of the beginning of life” has to be considered to have lapsed.

In relation to international law, all modern human rights treaties, including the
European Convention, originate in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights
according to which “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”
under Article 3. Nothing was specified as to the beginning or end of life.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was meant to
implement the Universal Declaration. Article 6 §1 reads: “[e]very human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life”. There is no mention of abortion or of the exclusion of the unborn
from the protection of right to life in this Article. However, Article 6 §5 specifies that a
death sentence “shall not be carried out on pregnant women”, implicitly recognising the
right to life of the unborn, or at least the value of his/her life. Therefore, Article 6
guarantees the protection of unborn children, at least against the capital punishment of

54 See S. Blance, “Brüstle v Greenpeace (C-34/10): ‘The End for Patents Relating to Human Embryonic Stem
Cells in Europe?’ IP Quarterly <http://www.avidity-ip.com/assets/pdf/Brustlemar12.pdf> (last accessed:
10 May 2013).
55 Vo v. France, supra note 23 at para. 82.
the mother. When the text was adopted in 1966, the death penalty was legal in many jurisdictions, whereas abortion on demand was a crime in most countries of the world.

With regard to international treaties, the Preamble of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child reiterated a provision of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1959, declaring that “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”. Among regional treaties, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights expressly protects life from conception. According to Article 4 §1 “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.

III – The Convention does not contain a right to abortion

A. There is no right to die or a right to abortion under the Convention

The Court declared in the Pretty v. United Kingdom56 case that “Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination”.57 Similarly, the Grand Chamber of the Court declared in the A. B. & C. v. Ireland case that “Article 8 cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion”.58 In addition to these clear statements, the Court, in Maria do Céu Silva Monteiro Martins Ribeiro v. Portugal,59 declared inadmissible an application claiming a right of access to abortion on

56 Pretty supra note 12.
57 Ibid. at paras. 39 and 40; “[a]rticle 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life. The Court accordingly finds that no right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from Article 2 of the Convention. It is confirmed in this view by the recent Recommendation 1418 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe”.
58 A., B. & C. supra note 5 at para. 214.
59 In Maria do Céu Silva Monteiro Martins Ribeiro v. Portugal, 26 October 2004, no. 16471/02. The applicants criticised “the Portuguese law on abortion and abortion on demand which was considered by
demand against the national legislation, which was deemed too restrictive by the applicant.

B. There is no right to practise abortion under the Convention

Just as there is no right to have an abortion, there is no right to practise it. The doctors cannot invoke such a right and complain of their conviction for practising illegal abortion. The Commission and the Court have rejected applications brought by physicians for having been convicted for aiding or practising illegal abortions. In the case of Jerzy Tokarczyk v. Poland, the Court held that the complaint of a gynaecologist against his conviction of aiding and abetting abortion was manifestly ill-founded. The applicant offered his assistance to women who wished to have an abortion, to organise their journey to the Ukraine, where they had abortions in a public hospital. In Jean-Jacques Amy v. Belgium, the former Commission declared inadmissible an application concerning the penal conviction of a Belgian physician for having practised an illegal abortion.

However, the Court recognises that there is a right of health professionals not to perform abortion. In R. R. v. Poland and P. & S. v. Poland, the Court acknowledged “the freedom of conscience of health professionals in the professional context” in relation to abortion. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (hereafter P.A.C.E.) adopted a Resolution in 2010, strongly upholding “the right to conscientious objection in lawful medical care” declaring that: “No person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a refusal to perform abortion on demand of the pregnant woman” (unofficial translation).

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63 R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, 26 May 2011 at para. 206: “[T]he Court, States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a way as to ensure that an effective exercise of the freedom of conscience of health professionals in the professional context does not prevent patients from obtaining access to services to which they are entitled under the applicable legislation.”
to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion, the performance of a human miscarriage, or euthanasia or any act which could cause the death of a human foetus or embryo, for any reason”.

In 2010, when the *A. B. & C. v. Ireland* judgment was delivered, some expected the Court to create or recognise a “right” to abortion, as a development of “women’s rights” and of the so-called “sexual and reproductive rights”, like several European countries did previously. This was particularly expected because the P.A.C.E. adopted a Resolution on 16 April 2008, on access to safe and legal abortion in Europe, “inviting” the Member States of the Council of Europe to decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits, if they have not already done so and to guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right of access to a safe and legal abortion”. However, the P.A.C.E. Resolutions are not binding, neither on States nor on the Court; they only provide for a political interpretation of the Convention. They also indicate a trend, in the European public opinion, on a specific matter. Nevertheless, the Court could not follow the P.A.C.E. on a path so far away from the original writing of the Convention.

**C. The Court cannot interpret the Convention so as to create new rights not included in the Convention or which are contrary to the existing rights**

The Court cannot create a right to abortion because its interpretive power is limited: “the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. However, the Court cannot, by means of evolutive interpretation, derive from these instruments a right that was not included at the outset. This is particularly

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64 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1763 (2010) of 7 October 2010 on “The Right to Conscientious Objection in Lawful Medical Care”.
66 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted on 16 April 2008 a Resolution N°1607 *Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe* (Hereinafter Parliamentary Resolution).
67 Parliamentary Resolution paras. 7; 7.1 and 7.2. The Assembly has moderated the original wording of the Draft Resolution introducing a reference to the time limit, and withdrawing the concept of “right to abortion”, substituting it by the “right of access to a safe and legal abortion”. The Draft resolution (Doc. 11537 rev.2) stated: the Assembly “invites the Member States of the Council of Europe to decriminalise abortion, if they have not already done so and to guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right to abortion”.

so here, when the omission was deliberate”. Therefore, under no circumstances, and even interpreting the rights enshrined in the Convention in an evolutive manner, can the Court create new human rights which are not included in the Convention. In this respect, the Court cannot oblige States to allow wider access to abortion than they have currently decided to allow.

Moreover, the Court cannot interpret the Convention contra legem, creating a new right directly opposed to an existing right guaranteed by the text of the Convention. An alleged right to abortion (or to euthanasia), cannot be deduced from the Convention because it would conflict with Article 2 protecting the right to life. Article 2 contains only a limited number of exceptions, and does not allow the Court to create new exceptions. In this respect, the Convention should be “read as a whole”.

The Court has recognised that it cannot, on one hand, impose an obligation to protect life by law and, on the other hand, condemn a State for not assisting in suicide. What the Court recognised regarding the facilitation of a breach of life by assisted suicide, should also be recognised regarding the facilitation of a breach of life by abortion. The same principles apply with regard to legal euthanasia and abortion.

D. Legality of a practice does not create a right to that practice

When the Court mentions the “right of access to lawful abortion”, it can only refer to a “right” granted by the national legislation and not by the Convention. It is an abuse of language of the Court to refer to a “right of access to lawful abortion” or to a “right to decide on the termination of a pregnancy” in the abortion cases against Poland and Ireland, as it is well-established that there is no such “right”, neither in the

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68 Johnston & others v. Ireland, no. 9697/82, Judgment of 18 December 1986 at para. 53.
69 Ibid. See also Emonet & others v. Switzerland, No. 39051/03, judgment of 13 December 2007 at para. 66: “the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from these instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where the omission was deliberate”.
70 A., B. & C., supra note 5 at para. 214.
71 Pretty, supra note 12 at paras. 39-40.
72 Haas v. Switzerland, no. 31322/07, 20 January 2011 at para. 54 [hereinafter Haas].
73 Ibid.
74 For example in P. & S. v. Poland, supra note 62 at para. 99.
75 Ibid. at para. 98.
Irish and Polish legislation, nor in the legislation of any other country where abortion is a derogation to the principle of the protection of life. It is inappropriate for the Court to use the term “right”, because legality does not create a right. The legality of a practice does not entitle individuals to exercise it, nor does it create a positive obligation on the State to provide for this practice or render its exercise effective. For example, the legality of euthanasia, drugs or prostitution does not create a subjective right to be killed or to have drugs or sex. The same can be said of any medical treatment: its legality does not oblige the State to provide it. There is often confusion between legality and entitlement, particularly in relation to Article 8.

E. Desire does not create a right

In *Costa & Pavan v. Italy* the Court went even further, finding that the desire of the applicants under Article 8 may constitute a right. Wishing to have a child free from a genetic disease, the applicants asserted that the legal prohibition of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis infringed their private and family life. In order for this case to come within the scope of the Convention, the Court set forth that the “wish” to have a healthy child “constitutes an aspect of their private and family life which is protected by Article 8”. Therefore, according to the Court, the legal impossibility to fulfil this wish through artificial procreation techniques gives the applicants the status of “victims” and infringes their right to respect for private and family life. The Court believes that this respect for private and family life encompasses a “right [of parents] to give birth to a child who does not suffer from the disease they are carriers of”, meaning they have a right to give birth to a healthy child. Thus, the wish to have a child free from disease constitutes a right which imposes obligations on the State. Transforming the “parent’s wish to have a child” or the “woman’s will to abort a child” into a “right” gives a false conception of human rights, namely a projection of the individual will into the social order. Following this approach, every individual desire will fall within the ambit of Article 8

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76 *Costa & Pavan v. Italy*, No. 54270/10, 28 August 2012.
77 Ibid. at para. 57 (Only available in French).
78 Ibid. at para. 65.
and will become a “right”, because, fundamentally, any restriction to an individual’s desire is perceived as an offence. With this mindset, abortion, euthanasia, drugs or sexual activity (incest\textsuperscript{80} or sadomasochism\textsuperscript{81}) tend to be analysed as individual freedoms stemming from Article 8.

**F. Choice does not create a right**

The Court followed the same logic with regard to assisted suicide. Considering that, “[t]he applicant in this case is prevented by law from exercising her choice to avoid what she considers will be an undignified and distressing end to her life.”\textsuperscript{82} the Court established in the case of *Haas v. Switzerland*, “that an individual’s right to decide by what means and at what point his or her life will end, provided he or she is capable of freely reaching a decision on this question and acting in consequence, is one of the aspects of the right to private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention”\textsuperscript{83}. Here, the personal choice becomes a right, more precisely, a freedom which can be subject to limitations and, like any other freedom, does not need the intervention of a third party (i.e. the holder of the freedom has the ability to determine his/her own free will and to act accordingly by himself). Meanwhile, a woman who wants to have an abortion cannot act alone. The performance of an abortion cannot be attained by an individual acting independently; it requires the direct intervention of the State and of the medical practitioners and it also involves the unborn child. Therefore, it is impossible to consider abortion a freedom, any more than any other contentious practice.

\textsuperscript{80} *Stübing v. Germany*, no. 43547/08, 12 April 2012.
\textsuperscript{82} *Pretty, supra* note 12 at para. 67: “[t]he applicant in this case is prevented by law from exercising her choice to avoid what she considers will be an undignified and distressing end to her life. The Court is not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It considers below whether this interference conforms with the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 8.”
\textsuperscript{83} *Haas, supra* note 72 at para. 51.
G. The creation of a right to abortion would change the philosophy of the Convention

When the Court speaks of a right to abortion, a right to have a child or a right to assisted suicide, it follows current dominant individualistic ideology. These assertions may be satisfactory ideologically speaking, but they are legally inconsistent with the Convention, which does not confer a right to have a child, a right to abortion or a right to assisted suicide. This inconsistency appears more and more clearly with every judgment of the Court on sensitive issues. Fundamentally, this evolutive interpretation cannot reconcile the wording of the Convention with postmodern ideology. To consider abortion as a right would be *ultra vires*. It would ultimately constitute a diametric shift of the Convention from protecting the human being in his/her very nature to protecting his autonomous will. Indeed, individual autonomy is a set of capacities by which each person determines how to use his/her or her faculties and abilities, i.e. freedom of action. It is the matrix of the person’s judgments and actions, but it is not a matrix of rights. Individual autonomy is the source of individual freedoms, which are protected to a certain extent under the Convention, but it cannot be the source of ultimate and superseding individual rights, for which society would be liable.

Such a change would induce a change of anthropology. The wording of the Convention, especially that of Articles 8, 9 and 12, expresses an underlying anthropology based on natural law which was inherited from the Humanist Age. This anthropology would be considered out-of-date and replaced by the liberal anthropology, which considers the individual’s free will as the ultimate and only good and right. The so-called right to abortion implies the domination of individual will over life, subjectivity over objectivity. Accepting it would resettle the Convention into a liberal and individualistic philosophy whereby the legitimacy of the law would be based in the “individual”, instead of the “human being” and “human nature”.

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84 The Court stated in *Sijakova v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, no. 67914/01, decision of 6 March 2003, that neither the right to marry and to found a family, nor the right to private and family life or any other right guaranteed by the Convention imply a right to procreation.
85 *A. B. & C*, supra note 5 at para. 214.
86 *Pretty*, supra note 12.
IV – Abortion is a derogation from the right to life

A. Abortion cannot constitute a right in itself

Most States which permit abortion allow it as a derogation from the right to life in their national law.87 In France, for example, the Civil Code states that: “ Legislation ensures the primacy of the person, prohibits any infringement of the latter's dignity and safeguards the respect of the human being from the outset of life”.88 The Code of Public Health reiterates this statement and specifies that the only exceptions must be necessary and prescribed by law.89 Therefore, those States do not question the applicability of the right to life to the period of life before birth, though they allow a limited possibility to detract from this rule. This means that for all States allowing abortion as a derogation, the right to life, in principle, covers and protects life before birth. This is why legislation is necessary before abortion can be practised. If the foetus or the embryo were nothing, or nothing more than an insignificant element produced by the body of the woman, like the hair, there would be no need of a law to permit abortion.

Abortion, being a derogation of the right to life, cannot constitute a right in itself; it cannot become an autonomous right. As a derogation, its scope is limited by the principle to which it refers. President Costa explained in this regard that:

I believe (as do many senior judicial bodies in Europe) that there is life before birth, within the meaning of Article 2, that the law must therefore protect such life, and that if a national legislature considers that such protection cannot be absolute, then it should only derogate from it, particularly as regards the voluntary termination of pregnancy, within a regulated framework that limits the scope of the derogation.90

For example, we can presume that the Court would not consider proportionate a practice such as partial-birth abortion or selective abortion according to the sex or colour of the skin. Thus, abortion is limited and cannot be considered an absolute and

87 See, amongst others, the legislation of Italy, Poland and Germany.
88 French Civil Code, Article 16.
89 Ibid. at Article L. 2211-1 : “ La loi assure la primauté de la personne, interdit toute atteinte à la dignité de celle-ci et garantit le respect de l'être humain dès le commencement de sa vie”. Article L. 2211-2 : “[…] ne saurait être porté atteinte au principe mentionné à l'article L. 2211-1 qu'en cas de nécessité et selon les conditions définies par le présent titre ….”
90 Jean-Paul Costa, Separate opinion under Vo v. France, supra note 23 at para. 17.
autonomous right. From a more fundamental point of view, this respects the principle that a positive right can only pursue a good *per se*. It cannot be aimed at the realisation of a wrong, even if this wrong is permitted by law in consideration of its supposed inevitability or necessity.

**B. The “conditional applicability” of the Convention to the unborn child**

According to the doctrine of the “conditional applicability” of the Convention, when a State chooses to establish a right which is not guaranteed by the Convention *per se*, it can fall, to a certain extent, under the protection of the Convention. Such a “conditional right” is not an “autonomous right” steaming directly from the Convention; therefore, the Court cannot oblige a State to establish such right.

However, once a State has decided to afford a “conditional right,” then it must respect the Convention as to how it is afforded, for instance, without illegitimate discrimination. Applied, for example, to the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention would mean that although States are not required to establish a second degree of jurisdiction in civil matters, if they are doing so, the requirements of this Article will apply also to this second degree of jurisdiction. The Court will apply the Convention on this internal right. This means that when the Court applies the Convention, it has to acknowledge the choice made by the national legislator to grant specific rights and protections that are not afforded by the Convention but are consistent with it (in accordance with article 53 of the Convention).

Another example is the choice of the national legislator to allow adoption by single persons. In this instance, the State must afford this “right” without discrimination of single persons based on sexual orientation.91

The Court applied this doctrine to the matter of abortion, declaring that once a State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing

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abortion, its legal framework should respect the Convention. Simultaneously, if States recognise in their internal legal order that the right to life covers, in principle, life before birth, or the reality that the embryo or foetus is a “person”, the Court should apply the Convention by taking into account this reality, applying article 2 to the unborn child. Therefore, in those cases, the Court should not limit itself to merely observing the absence of a European consensus on the beginning of life, but it should also look at whether the national legislation recognises (at least to a certain extent) the right to life of the unborn child, or the fact that he or she is a “person.” If the Court applied this doctrine to Article 8 concerning abortion, although abortion is not a right, but a derogation, why should it not apply it to Article 2 concerning the principle of the right to life of the unborn child, which is a clearly protected right, at least at a certain stage of development?

C. The “margin of appreciation”

The fact that abortion derogates from the legal protection of life before birth and is not a right per se explains perfectly the way the Court used the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” in A. B. & C. v. Ireland. It has not been understood by some commentators and therefore needs to be explored further.

In A. B. & C., the Court considered that a broad margin of appreciation should be accorded to Ireland because of the “acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by the question of abortion or as to the importance of the public interest at stake”. The Court did “not consider that this consensus among a substantial majority of the contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion

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94 A. B. & C., supra note 5.
96 A. B. & C., supra note 5 at para. 233.
on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law\textsuperscript{97} decisively narrows the broad margin of appreciation of the State”\textsuperscript{98}

In a dissenting opinion, six judges\textsuperscript{99} expressed their disagreement with the decision of the Grand Chamber on this point. They considered that the existence of a consensus on abortion among Member States of the Council of Europe should have been used to narrow the width of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Ireland, in order to straighten the dynamic interpretation of the Convention\textsuperscript{100} towards the development of a right to wider access to abortion. This opinion has been shared by several commentators of this judgment.\textsuperscript{101} The dissenting judges pointed out that it is “the first time that the Court has disregarded the existence of a European consensus on the basis of “profound moral views”. They argued that the fact that these “moral views” “can override the European consensus, which tends in a completely different direction, is a real and dangerous new departure in the Court’s case-law”.\textsuperscript{102} They cannot accept that “profound moral views” may impede the dynamic extension of human rights\textsuperscript{103} created by the Court through its interpretation of the Convention as a “living instrument in the light of present-day conditions.\textsuperscript{104} Such understanding of the margin of appreciation of the States, if applied, would severely hinder the possibilities of activism in moral and sensitive matters. Restraint was again shown by the Grand Chamber shortly after \textit{A. B. \& C. v. Ireland} in another ruling on bioethics.\textsuperscript{105}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid.} at para. 235.
\item \textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.} at para. 236.
\item \textsuperscript{99} \textit{Ibid.} See the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozaklis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelia, Malinverni and Poalelungi who considered that the acknowledgment of this consensus should have reduced Ireland’s margin of appreciation.
\item \textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.} Partly Dissenting Opinion at para 9.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Referring to the preamble of the Convention: “[C]onsidering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its Members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
\item \textsuperscript{104} \textit{Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, supra} note 50 at para. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{105} \textit{S. H. and others v. Austria, [GC]}, no. 57813/02, 3 November 2011 at para. 97. The Grand Chamber judged that the Austrian government has a wide margin of appreciation because the matter “continues to give rise today to sensitive moral and ethical issues”.
\end{itemize}
It is true that a large number of Member States have more or less a similar view on the “woman’s right” over the life of her unborn child, but there is no general consensus on the other side,\textsuperscript{106} namely on the right to life of the unborn child, which depends on “the question of when the right to life begins”.\textsuperscript{107} It is not sufficient for the Court to assess the proportionality of Irish law on abortion by looking whether a fair balance has been struck between the interests of the mother and the other rights and interests involved in the issue. Such a balance is not possible if the State recognises the unborn child as a person: you cannot strike a balance between the rights and interests of one person and the life another one. Therefore, it is important to understand that the question of the legal status of the unborn child takes precedence over the status of the “woman’s right” over the life of her unborn child. Indeed, the value of an individual right over an object cannot be evaluated if the nature of this object has not been previously determined.

Whereas, according to the doctrine of conditional applicability, the Court should have applied the Convention to the unborn child, the Grand Chamber preferred to reaffirm that it is “impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2”. Therefore “the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the mother”.\textsuperscript{108}

In \textit{A. B. \& C. v. Ireland}, it is not only the “moral views” against abortion that have overridden the European consensus in favour of abortion. For the Court, the

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.: “in determining the question whether a fair balance was struck between the protection of that public interest, notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn, and the conflicting rights of the … applicants to respect for their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention” (para. 233).

\textsuperscript{107} A., B. \& C., \textit{supra} note 5 at para. 237.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.: “Of central importance is the finding in the above-cited Vo case, referred to above, that the question of when the right to life begins came within the States’ margin of appreciation because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, so that it was impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2. Since the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the mother are inextricably interconnected (see the review of the Convention case-law at paras. 75-80 in the above-cited \textit{Vo v. France} [G.C.] Judgment), the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the mother”.
consensus in favour of abortion is not sufficient, as it also has to answer the question of
the status of the unborn child in the internal legal order.

When balancing different interests at stake in the A., B. & C. case, the dissenting
judges looked only to the “moral and ethical issues raised by the question of abortion”
and did not consider “the public interest at stake”\textsuperscript{109} which is deemed important by the
Court to justify the restrictions on abortion. Within the notion of “public interest [!] is
notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn”,\textsuperscript{110}
The protection of the “right to life of the unborn” is not only a moral view; in Ireland, it
is a constitutional obligation consistent with the Convention.

D. The ambivalent use of the notion of “consensus”

It is also necessary to highlight that the Court generally uses the concept of
consensus in a specific way, different from its definition in international law. In the
Court’s view, there is a consensus when a large majority of Member States shares a
common view on a certain issue. However, in international law,\textsuperscript{111} as well as within the
other bodies of the Council of Europe,\textsuperscript{112} consensus is an agreement by absence of
explicit opposition. A consensus is a method of reaching an agreement on international
law based on “\textit{qui tacet consentire videtur}”.\textsuperscript{113}

Sometimes we may be surprised by the way the Court uses this notion. When
only three or four States prohibit abortion, the Court has found a broad consensus in
favour of the legalisation of abortion, but when four States allow euthanasia,\textsuperscript{114} the

\textsuperscript{109} A., B. & C., supra note 5 at para. 233.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} H. Cassan, “Le consensus dans la pratique des Nations Unies”, \textit{Annuaire français de droit international},
\textsuperscript{112} Such as in the rules of the Committee of Ministers. See CM/Del/Dec (92)472/44 and Annexe 19.
\textsuperscript{113} Silence gives or implies consent. The consensus also designates the result of this method, the
agreement itself.
\textsuperscript{114} In \textit{Koch v. Germany}, no. 479/09, 19 July 2012 at para 70, the Court noted that “only four States
examined allowed medical practitioners to prescribe a lethal drug in order to enable a patient to end his
or her life.” The Court concluded that “State Parties to the Convention are far from reaching a consensus
in this respect, which points towards a considerable margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in this
context”.
Court has not found a broad consensus in favor of the ban, but an absence of consensus in favour of its legalisation.\textsuperscript{115} The issues for which the Court uses the notion of consensus are precisely those that have often lacked, and continue to lack, a consensual approach among European States. Whereas it can be used to describe objectively the legal situation in European countries, the notion of consensus is departing from this objective utilisation to become an element of the “progressive” understanding of human rights. Within this new perspective, the notion of consensus is used as a sociological indicator of the degree of acceptance of a new freedom in the collective consciousness.

In practice, the examination of the consensus is often more a study of the evolution of public opinion on a sensitive matter. Such examination of the existence of a consensus is accomplished with the belief that practices such as assisted suicide, abortion or artificial procreation are new individual freedoms and will be recognised ineluctably as such against all social prohibitions. This liberal perspective explains why the Court ends up with opposite conclusions on the matters of abortion and of assisted suicide, while in terms of comparative law, the situation is identical.

The case of Schalk \& Kopf v. Austria\textsuperscript{116} shows how the concept of consensus can be used to develop human rights with this progressive vision. Addressing the question of whether the right to marry can benefit same-sex couples, the Court noticed that “there is an emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples”, but that there is not “yet”\textsuperscript{117} a majority of States providing this legal recognition. The Court recognises consequently that it “must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national authorities”.\textsuperscript{118} As a consequence, the Court declared that this question must therefore be regarded as one of “evolving rights”\textsuperscript{119} and that States are “still free”\textsuperscript{120} to restrict access to marriage to different-sex

\textsuperscript{115} Today in Europe, there is a broad agreement against euthanasia, with four exceptions. However, the Court reversed the perspective by adopting a liberal logic according to which States must justify restrictions laid down on the exercise of euthanasia as if euthanasia was a new breeding ground for human rights. Yet there is no doubt that the drafters of the Convention, at the end of WWII and the Nuremberg trials, precisely wanted to fight against such practices.

\textsuperscript{116} Schalk \& Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. at para 105.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. at para. 62.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. at para. 105.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. at para. 108.
couples. In conclusion, States enjoy a margin of appreciation, but this margin is limited to “the timing” of the legal recognition.

The detailed discussion in the A. B. & C. case on abortion is also an example, among many others, of how the Court takes public opinion into account. Indeed, the status of opinion can even determine the outcome of a judgment, because the Court also views human rights as a matter of timing: it will recognise new human rights and impose new obligations progressively, according to the ability of public opinion to accept it. This approach implies that the Court has a “vision” of what human rights are, and progressively realises it through its case-law.

The Court uses consensus in order to develop the Convention by recognising new rights that were not originally explicitly guaranteed by this treaty. As any other dynamic process of interpretation which constantly needs to prove its legitimacy, the Court seeks guidance in the legal and social landscape of the Member States, particularly when it wants to give a new meaning to the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In this process of interpretation of the provisions of the Convention, the Court relies on the trends of domestic laws, as well as on any other legal instrument. Although the Court states that it cannot create a right that is not already included in the Convention, and that it cannot interpret the Convention against its own wording, as it would be *ultra vires*, its case-law indicates the opposite. In reality, the Court interprets the Convention extensively, sometimes even against the original intention of its authors, or even against the wording of the Convention. The Court feels authorised to follow such an interpretation when a trend among the Member States on

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121 Johnston & others v. Ireland, No. 9697/82, Judgment of 18 December 1986 at para. 53; Emonet & others v. Switzerland, No. 39051/03, Judgment of 13 December 2007 at para. 66; “the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from these instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where the omission was deliberate.”

122 This is particularly evident in the interpretation of Article 8 on privacy.

123 For example, by extending the application of Article 12 (family life) to situations not covered by its wording, Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, supra note 116 at paras. 101 and 105. Also see Bayatyan v. Armenia, No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011 recognising the right of conscientious objection to military service

124 For example see the recent judgment in the case of Sindicatul Pastorul Cel Bun v. Romania, no. 2330/09 of 31 January 2012. The Court decides, against the first sentence of Art. 11-2 that under Article 11, the State may only impose restrictions of union liberty to the three groups mentioned in paragraph 2 of this provision, namely members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State, provided these restrictions are lawful.
this new development can be found in national legislation, in the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers, or in other legal instruments of the Council of Europe, all instruments posterior to the Convention. Such an extensive interpretation becomes clearly ultra vires if it is contra legem or if there is no real and full agreement within all Member States, i.e. when there is no consensus, stricto sensu. In this situation, the notion of consensus is used in order to override residual resistance of some States to the recognition of new developments of the Convention.\footnote{\textit{A. B. \& C. v. Ireland} would have liked, especially after the adoption of the P.A.C.E. Resolution on abortion,\footnote{P.A.C.E. Resolution on Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe recognized that: “[a]bortion must, as far as possible, be avoided.”} to have this European consensus in favour of abortion override the persistent decision of Irish people to protect the unborn child.}

\textbf{V – If the State allows abortion, it remains subject to the obligation to protect and respect competing rights and interests}

\textbf{A. The right to life implies negative and positive obligations of the State}

In the case of \textit{H. v. Norway},\footnote{\textit{H. v. Norway}, supra note 28 at 167.} which concerned an abortion carried out against the father's wishes, the Commission stated “that Article 2 required the State not only to refrain from taking a person’s life intentionally, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard life”.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} See also, for example, \textit{L.C.B. v. The United Kingdom}, Judgment of 9 June 1998, \\ \textit{Reports of Judgments and Decisions} 1998-III at para. 36.} Therefore, the right to life implies positive and negative obligations on the State, as has been reiterated many times following this decision.\footnote{\textit{H. v. Norway}, supra note 28; \textit{LCB v. The United Kingdom}, Judgment of 9 June 1998 at para. 36 and \textit{Pretty v. The United Kingdom}, supra note 12 at para. 38.} As regards the negative obligation, the State must absolutely refrain from taking a person’s life intentionally. Meanwhile, considering the positive obligation, the State enjoys a margin of appreciation in determining the means by which the life of those within its jurisdiction will be safeguarded. The role of the Court is to assess, according to the

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\textsuperscript{125} The normal way to introduce new rights, that were not recognised in the Convention and cannot stem from it, is the adoption of optional protocols, such as the one on abolition of the death penalty.

\textsuperscript{126} P.A.C.E. Resolution on Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe recognized that: “[a]bortion must, as far as possible, be avoided”.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{H. v. Norway}, supra note 28.
circumstances of each case, whether the State took the necessary steps to secure “everyone’s right to life”.  

B. When abortion is legal, “its legal framework shall adequately take into account the different legitimate interests involved”

If the State decides to permit abortion, it remains subject to the obligation to protect and respect competing rights and interests. Therefore, the fact that a State permits a derogation from a right does not waive the State’s obligations under the Convention with respect to this right and to other rights affected by this measure. The “margin of appreciation is not unlimited” “as to how it [the State] balances the conflicting rights of the mother” with the “protection of the unborn”.

The Court has several times recalled that if and “once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations”, “the legal framework devised for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention”. Therefore, the legalisation of abortion does not exempt the State from its responsibility to respect the fundamental rights and interests which are protected by the Convention, and also those that are affected by the decision to allow abortion. When abortion is legal, the fair balance between the regulation of abortion in order to secure the life and health of the mother and the other competing rights and interests, among which the protection of the unborn child, becomes the main principle underpinning the reasoning of the Court on abortion.

130 Article 2 of the Convention.
131 A., B. & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5 at para. 238.
132 Ibid. at para. 237.
133 Ibid.
The Court, as well as the Commission, has always assessed the proportionality of abortion taking into account the various competing interests. In the case of *Boso v Italy*, for example, the Court assessed the balance “between, on the one hand, the need to ensure protection of the foetus and, on the other hand, the woman’s interests” and concluded that there was no violation of Article 2. As judge Jean-Paul Costa has explained: “I would have had to reach the opposite conclusion had the legislation been different and not struck a fair balance between the protection of the foetus and the mother’s interests. Potentially, therefore, the Court reviews compliance with Article 2 in all cases in which the “life” of the foetus is destroyed.

Similarly, in the *Haas v. Switzerland* case concerning assisted suicide (which is legal under certain conditions in Switzerland), the Court held that respect for the right to life compels the national authorities to take positive measures to protect individuals from making a hasty decision and to prevent abuse of the system. The Court underlined in particular that the risk of abuse inherent in a system which facilitates assisted suicide cannot be underestimated, and concluded that the restriction on access to assisted suicide was intended to protect health and public safety and to prevent crime. Therefore, even when assisted suicide is allowed, as in Switzerland, the State must prevent the abuse of this facility because of the State’s obligation to protect life, particularly as it concerns vulnerable people. This should also apply regarding abortion. Women undergoing abortion are in distress and therefore vulnerable, especially if they are minors, disabled, struggling financially or seeking an abortion for psychological reasons. The same principle applies when considering the mother’s interest under the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.

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136 *Boso v. Italy, supra* note 20.
137 *Ibid.*: “[I]n the Court’s opinion, such provisions [regarding abortion] strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the need to ensure protection of the foetus and, on the other, the woman’s interests”.
139 *Haas, supra* note 72 at para. 54;
140 *Ibid* at para. 58.
141 *A., B. & C., supra* note 5 at para. 213: “[T]he woman’s right to respect for her private life must be weighed against other competing rights and freedoms invoked including those of the unborn child.” See also, *Tysiąc v. Poland Judgment* at para. 106; and *Vo v. France, supra* note 23 at paras. 76, 80 and 82.
As the Grand Chamber reiterated in *Vo v. France*: “it is also clear from an examination of these cases [of the Commission and Court] that the issue has always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rights or freedoms”.\(^{142}\) The Court has already had the opportunity to identify a number of these fundamental rights and “legitimate interests involved”\(^{143}\) which the State must consider when legislating on access to abortion.

These rights and legitimate interests frame the actions of the State while defining, within its margin of appreciation, the legal framework of abortion. Many of these interests, among which the protection of life comes first, limit the scope of the derogation and reduce the possibility of legal abortion in regard to the Convention requirements. In fact, the only justification in favour of securing access to treatments that may result in abortion are the interests related to the protection of life and health of the mother. The other competing interests and rights advocate for the ban of abortion as we will see now. Indeed, it is a general principle of the Court’s case-law that a fundamental right guaranteed by the Convention (*i.e.* the right to life) cannot be subordinated or put on the same footing as an alleged right not guaranteed by the Convention, but only allowed in the internal legal order (*i.e.* abortion). As the Court made clear, “where restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention in order to protect ‘rights and freedoms’ not, as such, enunciated therein: in such a case only indisputable imperatives can justify interference with enjoyment of a Convention right”.\(^{144}\)

C. The “legitimate interests” restricting the scope of the derogation

In its case-law, the Court has already had the opportunity to identify a number of rights and interests justifying or requiring restrictions to the practice of abortion

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\(^{142}\) *Vo v. France*, *supra* note 23 at para. 80.


\(^{144}\) Chassagnou and others *v. France* [*GC*], Nos. 25088/94, 2833/95 and 2844/95, 29 April 1999 at para. 113: “where restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention in order to protect ‘rights and freedoms’ not, as such, enunciated therein: in such a case only indisputable imperatives can justify interference with enjoyment of a Convention right”.
when abortion is legal. For example, the Court has recognised in addition to the interest of protecting the right to life of the unborn child, the legitimate interest of society in limiting the number of abortions, the interests of society in relation to the protection of morals, the parental rights and the freedom and dignity of the woman. The Court has also recognised the interest of the father, the right to freedom of conscience of health professionals and institutions based on ethical or religious beliefs, and the freedom and dignity of the woman.

There are some cases currently pending before the Court regarding other interests and rights affected by abortion. These include the State’s duty to properly inform women of the risks associated with abortions, and the connection between abortion, eugenics and discrimination of disabled people (“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life cases”). This list is not exhaustive, but in continuous development. An example of such development is the issue of late abortions. Those abortions, practised after the first semester of pregnancy, will probably arrive before the Court. In the USA, the Supreme Court upheld the ban on partial birth abortion, considering that even when abortion is legal, not every method is acceptable: “the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn”. The question of human foetuses that are born alive,

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148 See mutatis mutandis the E.C.H.R. acknowledgment of the violation of women’s dignity by forced sterilisation.  
149 In Bosio v. Italy, supra note 20 and X. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 41. The Court acknowledged that the “potential fathers” were victims of the abortion, but that the abortion was justified by medical indications. A contrario, the proportionality test should have been different in case of abortion on demand.  
152 See mutatis mutandis the ECHR acknowledgment of the violation of women’s dignity by forced sterilisation.  
154 K. v. Latvia, no. 33911/08, pending; M. P. v. Romania, no. 39974/10, pending.  
surviving to late term abortions for some minutes or hours, and who receive no care until death, may also come before the Court or the Council of Europe.

Other institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have identified other rights and interests which justify or necessitate limitations on access to abortion, such as the interest of society to ban sex selective abortion, also called “gendercide”. The United-Nations has, for many years, raised concerns about this issue for demographic and discriminative reasons. The Cairo Conference on Population and Development associates prenatal sex-selection with female infanticide.

Forced abortion has been identified as a crime against humanity since the Nuremberg trials. Ten Nazi leaders were indicted for “encouraging and compelling abortions”. More recently, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution which “condemns the practice of forced abortions and sterilisations globally, especially in the context of the one-child policy”. Coerced or compelled abortion is also impossible to justify under the Convention and this is clearly a violation of both rights of the mother and of the child. According to the Guttmacher Institute, 75% of women undergoing an abortion say they cannot afford a child; 75% say that having a baby would interfere with work, school or the ability to care for dependents; and 50% say they do not want to be a single parent or are having problems with their husband or partner. All those reasons invoked by women show that their choice is not free, but actually under social coercion. According to the International Conference on Population and Development

156 On October 3, 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1829 (2011) and Recommendation 1979 (2011) on sex selective abortion, admitting that abortion has negative effects on society, and therefore abortion cannot but be limited, and where it is legal, it must be regulated.
158 J. Hunt, St Joseph University, Philadelphia, “Abortion and the Nuremberg Prosecutors, a Deeper Analysis” at: <http://www.uflh.org/vol%207/hunt7.pdf> (last accessed: 10 May 2013). The author supports that, in the Nuremberg trial, abortion per se is considered a crime against humanity.
Plan of Action, “the aim of family planning programmes must be to enable couples and individuals to make free, responsible and informed decisions about childbearing”.\textsuperscript{161} In many cases, the consent of the mother is far from freely given. Hence those situations are sometimes comparable to forced abortion.

For these reasons, the Court could find a violation of the Convention if the legal framework of abortion does not allow the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention.\textsuperscript{162} These violations do not only address legislation which does not oppose or prevent extreme practices such as sex-selective or forced abortion, but also legislation permitting abortion without “proportionate” motives. In this regard, the causes of abortion, in particular, its social causes, should be viewed in light of the State’s obligation to protect life, family and human dignity and to adopt positive measures supporting them.

D. The “legitimate interests” justifying the derogation

The recent case-law of the Court suggests that, when abortion is legal, it should be considered both as a subjective “right of access to lawful abortion”\textsuperscript{163} and as a medical practice. As we explained previously, such “right” is not an autonomous conventional right, but a conditional right steaming only from the national legal order. It is also well-established that the Convention does not guarantee to individuals a right to have access to a certain medical practice.\textsuperscript{164} In reality, it is clear that abortion is neither a subjective right, as we saw above, nor a real medical practice, unless it has a “therapeutic” purpose necessary to preserve the mother. It is only in this specific circumstance that a patient may apply for the termination of her pregnancy under the Convention.

\textsuperscript{161} See the European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2012 on the forced abortion scandal in China (2012/2712(RSP)).


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. at para. 99: “In particular, the State is under a positive obligation to create a procedural framework enabling a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abortion”. See also Tysiące v. Poland, supra note 150 at paras. 116-124, R.R. v. Poland, supra note 63 at para. 200.

\textsuperscript{164} Tysiak v. Poland, supra note 150; Cyprus v. Turkey, [G.C.], no. 25781/94; Nikky Sentges v. Netherlands no. 27677/02.
When the continuation of the pregnancy puts the life of the mother at risk, the balancing of interests is possible. Fortunately, such cases occur very rarely. With regard to abortion practised in order to save the life of the mother, it has to be understood that this issue is not directly connected with the matter of the existence of a “right” to abortion. The prohibition of abortion is not an obstacle to the delivery of the necessary medical treatments that should be carried out to save the life of a pregnant woman, even if such treatment results in the loss of life of her unborn child, i.e. in the unintended termination of the pregnancy.\(^{165}\) A group of 140 gynaecologists and physicians underlined this in a common declaration on maternal healthcare in Dublin, Ireland.\(^{166}\) The same can be said of the prohibition of euthanasia and the medical treatments that may have the unintended, but expected, effect of shortening the life of the patient (doctrine of the double effect). The right of the woman which is pursued through such termination of the pregnancy is not a right to abortion, but her right to life.\(^{167}\) The Commission noted “that, already at the time of the signature of the Convention (4 November 1950), all High Contracting Parties, with one possible exception, permitted abortion when necessary to save the life of the mother”.\(^{168}\) Therefore, this issue was never a matter of public and ethical debate under the Convention. In relation to other medical matters, the Court held that an issue could arise under Article 2 of the Convention where it could be shown that the authorities put the individual’s life at risk through the denial of health care available to the population generally.\(^{169}\) The same principle applies to abortion when the woman’s life is at risk.

\(^{165}\) A., B. & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5 at para 238: “[a] prohibition of abortion to protect unborn life is not therefore automatically justified under the Convention on the basis of unqualified deference to the protection of pre-natal life or on the basis that the expectant mother’s right to respect for her private life is of a lesser stature.”. \(^{A\ contrario,\ this\ sentence\ means\ that\ “in\ principle”\ a\ prohibition\ of\ abortion\ to protect\ unborn\ life\ is\ justified\ under\ the\ Convention.}\(^{166}\) See The Irish Times, 10 September 2012, “Forum in Dublin on Maternal Health”: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/forum-in-dublin-on-maternal-health-1.527381, (last accessed on May 10\(^{th}\) 2013). “[a]s experienced practitioners and researchers in Obstetrics and Gynecology, we affirm that direct abortion is not medically necessary to save the life of a woman. We uphold that there is a fundamental difference between abortion, and necessary medical treatments that are carried out to save the life of the mother, even if such treatment results in the loss of life of her unborn child. We confirm that the prohibition of abortion does not affect, in any way, the availability of optimal care to pregnant women.”

\(^{167}\) A., B. & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5 at para. 245.

\(^{168}\) X. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 41 at para. 20.

\(^{169}\) Nitecki v. Poland, no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002 (inadmissibility decision).
On the contrary, the mother’s physical or mental health may not prevail, when the life of the child is at stake and this is for the following reasons:

- The right to life is an absolute and inalienable right, it is at the very core of human rights; and as we saw above, the Court has never denied the quality of “person” of the unborn child, and therefore has never excluded him/her from the scope of the Convention. The frequent assertion that the relative right to health (of the mother) outweighs the absolute right to life (of the unborn child) implies that the unborn child is not considered a person, that he/she is ontologically different and inferior to his/her mother.

- The right to health is a goal only, which is not mentioned in the European Convention on Human Rights. The international treaties only “recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”\(^{170}\) and encourage States to take steps to achieve this goal. In the case-law of the Court, the protection of “health” falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention, securing the right to respect for one’s private life. It does not constitute an autonomous right stemming from the Convention. There is no general “right to health” under the Convention, such a right may exist, for example for a pregnant woman, only if her health is concretely endangered by the prohibition of abortion in the domestic law.\(^{171}\) This prohibition is not per se contrary to the Convention, but it has to be a proportionate measure. The proportionality of this prohibition is assessed according to the circumstances of the case, i.e. the medical situation of the mother and whether the State had other means to pursue the legitimate aim sought through the prohibition.

It is to be noted that the notion of “well-being” introduced in *A. B. & C. v. Ireland* has yet to be defined by the Court. Moreover, the Convention cannot create a “right to well-being” as this notion is very subjective. The Court itself stated that “the applicant’s

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subjective perception is not in itself sufficient to establish a breach of [the Convention].”

A difficulty which arises in these cases is to assess whether the threat to the health of the mother is severe or not, and whether abortion is a claim of convenience. Mental health may be used as an easy way of describing the inconvenience of an unexpected pregnancy and the threat of suicide may be abused. Abortion promoters insist that abortion is necessary to protect women’s health and that many women die due to illegal abortions. It is true that maternal mortality is high in Africa where abortion is usually illegal or strictly limited. Yet, this maternal mortality is not limited to abortion, it includes miscarriages and births, and it is linked to the generally poor quality of health services. In Latin America, the legal situation of abortion is comparable to that of Africa but maternal health services are of a better quality. In Europe, Ireland holds one of the best records in the world concerning maternal health (n° 1 in 2005, n° 3 in 2008), as well as Poland (n° 4 in 2005 and n° 10 in 2010). At the other end of the scale, a modern country like Latvia (n° 46 in 2005) with liberal laws on abortion has a rate of maternal mortality five times higher than Ireland. The United-States was n° 35 in 2012. This factual information is of a primary importance. It shows that, at least in Europe, there is no link between illegal abortions and high rates of maternal mortality. This contradicts the allegation of the promoters of a “right” to abortion who argue that restrictions on abortion on demand lead to maternal mortality. They advocate that “[w]omen’s right to abortion should be expanded to include abortion on request or for socio-economic reasons, as denial of which may significantly affect

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173 In the A., B. & C. case, one of the women said she had been diagnosed with cancer while pregnant and had to abort in order to begin treatment. However, she did not give any evidence of her state of health, not even a medical certificate.
176 Ibid.
177 The strategy of the promoters of a right to abortion on request is to affirm that restriction to abortion on demand leads to maternal mortality. See Zampas & Gher, supra note 8 at 255: “[t]he recognition by treaty-monitoring bodies that restrictive abortion laws may force women to seek illegal, and hence, unsafe abortions which threaten their lives, can be used by advocates to support abortion on request or for socio-economic reasons.” See also R. Sifris, “Restrictive regulation of abortion and the right to health”, (2010) 18 (2) Med Law Rev, 185-212. See also R. Yoshida, “Ireland’s restrictive abortion law: a threat to women’s health and rights?” (2011) 6(4) Clin Ethics, 172-178.
women’s mental or physical health”. Affirming that abortion should be legalised because the illegality of abortion can lead to unsafe abortions is a weak argument when confronted with the figures of maternal mortality. It amounts to choosing the lesser of two evils. This argument is also used in favour of the legalisation of drugs and prostitution. It can be summarised as follows: we recognise that drugs and prostitution are evil, but people will always use drugs or prostitution; therefore, “restrictive laws may force people to seek illegal, and hence, unsafe [drugs or prostitution] which threaten their lives”. Thus, according to their obligation to protect people’s lives, States should legalise drugs and prostitution and afford an effective right of access to lawful drugs and prostitution, which will include a positive obligation on the State to provide it. Yet, nobody would suggest that access to safe and legal sex or drugs is a human right, even when this practice comes within the ambit of private life and endangers individual life or health and well-being.

E. Procedural obligations of the State

In A. B. & C. v. Ireland (as well as mutatis mutandis in Tysiac, R. R. and P. & S. v. Poland, cases concerning Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention), the Court found a violation of the right to respect for the private life of the third applicant because she could not gain access to an effective procedure to establish whether she fulfilled the conditions established by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, which permits abortion on the grounds of a “real and substantial risk” to a woman’s life. The Court concluded

178 Zampas & Gher, supra note 8 at 269.
179 Ibid.
180 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 150.
181 P. & S. v. Poland, supra note 62.
182 Applicant C. affirmed (without any medical evidence submitted to the Court) that she had a rare form of cancer and, on discovering she was pregnant, had feared for her life as she believed that her pregnancy increased the risk of her cancer returning. She would not obtain treatment in Ireland while pregnant, without indicating what kind of cancer she had and without bringing any medical certificate proving at least that she consulted a doctor. Before the Court she complained about the failure by the Irish State to implement Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution by legislation and, notably, to introduce a procedure by which she could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland on grounds of the risk to her life due to her pregnancy (para. 243).
183 Bunreacht na hÉireann
that the applicant found herself in an “uncertain legal situation”\textsuperscript{185} which amounted to a violation of her right to respect for her private life. This judgment required the Irish Government to adopt measures so that applicant C, or any other woman in the same situation, would be able to know whether her medical situation would necessitate the termination of her pregnancy, as her pregnancy constitutes a risk to her life.\textsuperscript{186} In summary, the Court found that the national legal framework was not shaped in a manner which clarified the pregnant woman's legal position.\textsuperscript{187} Therefore, according to the Court, the violation of the right to private life of the applicants is not caused by the State’s decision to forbid or strictly limit abortion, but by the fact that the legislation puts women who are considering having an abortion in an excessively uncertain situation. For the Court, the respect for private life implies an obligation on the State to clarify the pregnant woman’s legal position.

Additionally, when it is established that the pregnant woman fulfils the legal conditions allowing access to abortion, the Court ruled that the State “must not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain an abortion”.\textsuperscript{188} It must enable “a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abortion”.\textsuperscript{189} In the end, State’s obligations are therefore mainly procedural in regard to a legal abortion carried out to save the life or preserve the health of a pregnant woman. The determination of the threshold of danger for the life or health of the woman justifying such an abortion belongs to the State.

\textsuperscript{185} A., B. \& C. v. Ireland, supra note 5 at para. 279.
\textsuperscript{186} The decision taken by the national authorities on whether the medical situation of applicant C would or would not necessitate the termination of the pregnancy has in no incidence provided for protection of the right to life of applicant C. In other words, this ruling does not require Ireland to make sure that abortion would be available to applicant C, but to clarify its regulation in one sense or the other, in order to respect the competing interest of the pregnant woman to know where she stands.
\textsuperscript{187} According to the Court, the procedural safeguards for situations where a disagreement arises as to whether the preconditions for a legal abortion are satisfied in a given case should be the following: first, they should take place before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the measures and the relevant evidence and to issue written grounds for its decision; second, the pregnant woman should be heard in person and have her views considered; third, the decisions should be timely, and fourth, the whole decision-making procedure should be fair and afford due respect to the various interests safeguarded by it.
\textsuperscript{188} P. \& S. v. Poland, supra note 62 at para. 99; see also Tysi\l{a}c v. Poland, supra note 150 and R. R. v. Poland, supra note 63.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
In *A. B. & C. v. Ireland*, the Grand Chamber reiterated its well-established caselaw while specifying that “it is not for this Court to indicate the most appropriate means for the State to comply with its positive obligations”. Therefore, it is for the Government to determine the most appropriate measures to adopt in order to prevent similar violations of the Convention in the future. This is a consequence of the subsidiary nature of the system of the Convention. The task of the Irish Government is to consider in which circumstances there is a “real and substantial risk to the life of the mother” and to provide for an “accessible and effective procedure” by which a pregnant woman can establish whether or not she fulfils the conditions for a lawful abortion according to Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, i.e. whether the risk to her life is real and makes the abortion necessary. In the language of the Court, “procedural and institutional procedures” do not imply legislation or regulation. The real requirement is that this procedure shall not be too complex *in concreto*. Within the Convention’s system, it is for each individual State to determine the most appropriate remedy, keeping in mind, in the field of medical care, that a balance also has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, and that the margin of appreciation is wide when “the issue involves an assessment of the priorities in the context of the allocation of limited State resources”.

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190 *A. B. & C. v. Ireland*, supra note 5 at para. 266, see also the previous references given by the Court.
191 It is true that in the *A., B. & C.* ruling the Court went very much into the details of the Irish law while identifying some problematic issues as to effectiveness of the existing procedures (paras 252-264), but those considerations are not binding: they have only an informative and explanatory purpose. The Court explains the reasons of its judgment. By indicating those reasons, the Court also makes some suggestions, but Ireland does not have to answer to each of those points.
192 *A., B. & C. v. Ireland*, supra note 5 at para. 64.
193 Ibid. at para. 267.
194 The Court can assess, after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicants, on a case by case basis, and decide by a binding judgment whether in a specific situation there has been a violation of the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention. It does not belong to the Court to indicate which general measures a State should adopt in order to prevent similar violations of the Convention in the future. The Court only indicates why a certain human right was violated and the State against which the Court has given a judgment remains free to choose the means that it considers necessary to ensure and implement the rights prescribed by the Convention to comply with the judgment. Similarly, during the supervision process of the execution, it belongs to the Committee of Ministers to decide whether the measures adopted can be considered as satisfactory, but not to indicate which general measures the State should have adopted.
195 See *Zehnalová and Zehnal v. The Czech Republic*, no. 38621/97, (Dec.) 14 May 2002; *O’Reilly and Others v. Ireland* (Dec.), no. 54725/00; *Sentges v. The Netherlands*, no. 27677/02, (Dec.) 8 July 2003.
At first glance, this procedural approach obliges Ireland and Poland only to clarify the concrete conditions of access to abortion; in actual practice, however, it goes far beyond that obligation. In order to execute the judgments, as the Court recommends196 (a recommendation which is not compulsory), Ireland197 and Poland will institute a decision-making mechanism to which women wishing to have an abortion will be able to address their demands. Poland, in order to carry out the Tysiac v. Poland judgment, established a committee of experts in charge of deciding on a case by case basis whether the conditions of access to an abortion are fulfilled. This committee will necessarily interpret those conditions. The composition of this committee is decisive and is debated within the Council of Europe: the pro-abortion advocates198 would like to reduce the number of doctors on such committees in favour of other professions and categories (lawyers, representatives of N.G.O.s, etc.). This request was backed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the right to health who affirms that “a commission composed exclusively of health professionals presents a structural flaw which is detrimental to its impartiality”.199 This issue is important, as doctors have a scientific, objective and concrete approach to the causes justifying a possible abortion. By contrast, lawyers and political organisations view abortion under the abstract angle of individual freedoms. What is at stake in the debate on the composition of those committees is the definition of the nature of abortion; on one side it is considered from a concrete and medical point of view and, on the other side, from an abstract point of view and as an individual freedom. If abortion is a freedom, its exercise inevitably clashes with the doctors’ assessment which is perceived as an illegitimate interference. This confrontation is stronger when the doctors invoke their freedom of conscience to refuse to carry out an abortion.

196 R. R. v. Poland, supra note 63 at para. 191: “[t]he Court has already held that in the context of access to abortion the relevant procedure should guarantee to a pregnant woman at least the possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered. The competent body or person should also issue written grounds for its decision”.
198 See the communication of the Centre for reproductive rights to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the answer of the Polish Government DH-DD(2010)610E (last accessed: 10 May 2013).
199 See the Report on Poland of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, M. Anand Grover, 20 May 2010, Human Rights Council, document n° A/HRC/14/20/Add.3).
The decisions of this committee should be timely, reasoned and in writing, to be challenged in the court system. Thus, the final decision to authorise abortion will belong no longer to the doctors or even to the committee of experts, but to the judge who will ultimately interpret the criteria for access to abortion. At present, no procedure has been proposed to challenge in the courts a decision authorising abortion. In practice, only a decision of refusal can go before the courts. The following questions remain unanswered: will the unborn child have a “lawyer” to defend him/her in this committee? Will safeguards be provided against the abusive interpretation by this committee of the legal conditions for access to abortion? In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the pressure to liberalise abortion is very strong, especially from the European and international institutions.

Thus, the final interpretative power of the conditions for access to abortion will be transferred to the judicial power and ultimately to the European Court of Human Rights. With such a mechanism, the European Court would soon be called on to decide on the reasons for decisions of refusal of those committees. This could likely be a new opportunity to advance the “right to abortion”. This procedural approach allows, ultimately, to remove the control of the framework of abortion from both the legislator and the doctors. This result is achieved while recognising the absence of a right to abortion under the Convention, and without it being necessary for the Court to comment on the prohibition in principle of abortion in Irish law. In order to impose this procedural obligation, it suffices to affirm, starting from an exception from the prohibition on the ground of danger to the life of the mother, that there is a ‘right’ to abortion and that this ‘right’ falls within the scope of article 8 of the Convention.

200 During its 6th December 2012 meeting, the delegates to the Committee of Ministers invited Ireland to answer the issue of the “general prohibition of abortion in criminal law”, as it constitutes “a significant chilling factor for women and doctors because of the risk of criminal conviction and imprisonment”, inviting “the Irish authorities to expedite the implementation of the judgment … as soon as possible”. <1157DH meeting of the Ministers' Deputies 04 December 2012, Decision concerning the execution of A, B & C v. Ireland judgment> (last accessed: 10 May 2013).

VI – Abortion on demand: a “blind spot” in the case-law of the Court and a violation of the Convention

It is uncontested that there is no direct, indirect or implicit right to abortion for socio-economic reasons or on demand in any international or regional treaty, including the Convention. Such abortions are illegal in three quarters of the countries in the world. Moreover, legal arguments supporting the conventionality of the practice of “abortion on demand” are very weak; in fact, they cannot withstand strict and coherent analysis.

A. Abortion on demand remains a blind spot in the case-law of the Court

The Court has not yet had the courage to determine if the practice of abortion on demand violates the Convention. The Court answered one side of the question judging that the prohibition of abortion on demand does not violate the Convention, but it never took the opportunity to answer the other side of the question: whether the practice of abortion on demand violates the Convention or not. Consequently, abortion on demand still remains a blind spot in the case-law of the Court. However, it is not difficult to deduce how the existing case-law of the Court should apply to it, if the Court were coherent in its case-law.

The Court has not yet examined concretely the compatibility of abortion on demand with the Convention, because until now, all such cases were introduced under

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202 Even the legal advisors of the Centre for Reproductive Rights agree with this statement. See Zampas & Gher, supra note 8: “[n]o international or regional treaty explicitly recognise women's right to abortion for socio-economic reasons or on request and no treaty-monitoring body has interpreted any provision of any treaty to require as such” (p. 287) “nor have they explicitly called for the legalisation of abortion on those grounds” (p. 255).

203 See L'avortement dans le monde, I.N.E.D.
<www.ined.fr/fr/tout_savoir_population/fiches_pedagogiques/naissances_natalite/avortement_monde/>
(last accessed: 10 May 2013).

204 See Maria do Céu Silva Monteiro Martins Ribeiro v. Portugal, no. 16471/02, 26 October 2004. See also A. B., & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5, where the Grand Chamber found no violation of article 8 in the case of the first two applicants who complained of the prohibition of abortion on demand. See Wicks, supra note 65 at 565.
the pretext of an extreme situation, such as therapeutic or eugenic abortions or abortions following a rape. Moreover, all applications brought by opponents to the legalisation of abortion have been deemed inadmissible for lack of locus standi, because they were not personally victims of the legalisation of abortion. But who can claim before the Court to be a victim of an abortion on demand? The real victims have had no chance to gain legal personality.

The only applicant the Court has recognised as a victim of an abortion is the father: “as a potential father...he could claim to be a victim”. However, in the two cases accepted by the Court, the abortions were justified by a “medical indication” and were not on demand. As the abortions were necessary for the health of the mothers, the balance with the fathers’ interests was deemed acceptable by the Court. Maybe the Court will one day consider a case brought by a “potential father” against his partner’s decision to undergo an abortion on demand. Indeed, because the father can contest before the E.C.H.R. the way in which the abortion is performed, he should also be entitled to contest the woman’s decision to undergo an abortion on demand on their child. Very recently, in P. & S. v. Poland, the Court also recognised that the pregnant woman’s mother had locus standi in the case.211

205 The factual basis of each of those cases was not clearly established or proved by the applicants. In A., B. & C. v. Ireland, applicant C did not present any medical certificates, whereas in P. & S. v. Poland, the man accused of the rape had not been prosecuted.
206 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 150; R. R. v. Poland, supra note 63; A., B. & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5.
207 P. & S. v. Poland, supra note 62.
208 See Borre Arnold Knudsen v. Norway, no. 11045/84, Decision of 8 March 1985 on the admissibility of the application; X. v. Austria, no. 7043/75, decision of 10 December 1976 on the admissibility; X. v. Norway, no. 867/60, Commission decision of 29 May 1961. According to this case-law, the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to examine in abstracto its compatibility with the Convention.
210 In the X. v. The United Kingdom case (ibid.), the Commission explicitly underlined that no other indications for abortion (the Commission mentions ethical, eugenic and social indications) or matter of time limitation arose in the case.
211 P. & S. v. Poland, supra note 62 at para. 99. The Court asserted that “it cannot be overlooked that the interests and life prospects of the mother of a pregnant minor girl are also involved in the decision whether to carry the pregnancy to term or not. Likewise, it can be reasonably expected that the emotional family bond makes it natural for the mother to feel deeply concerned by issues arising out of reproductive dilemmas and choices to be made by the daughter.” (para. 109).
B. Abortion on demand finds no justification under the Convention

In order for the Court to analyse the conventionality of the practice of abortion, the case should have, at least apparently, an objective motive that may outweigh the interests in favour of the protection of the life of the unborn child. Examining its case-law, it appears that the Court has never admitted that the autonomy of the woman could, on its own, suffice to justify an abortion. Indeed, it is difficult to identify which “legitimate interest” may be adequately protected by an abortion motivated mainly by free will. Only the right to personal autonomy may potentially encompass such practice of abortion, as is the case in numerous European States, where the justification of such abortion is the demand itself. That would imply that a right to abortion stems from the right to personal autonomy. However, as reaffirmed recently in P. & S. v. Poland, the Grand Chamber of the Court has held that “Article 8 cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion”.212 Therefore, while abortion on demand finds no justification under the Convention, it affects rights guaranteed by the Convention and interests recognised by it.213 The curtailment of those rights and interests by abortion on demand is not balanced with and justified by any competing right guaranteed by the Convention. Consequently, abortion on demand violates the Convention even though it represents the vast majority of all abortions performed. This violation by the State is even more flagrant when we do not merely consider the negative obligations of States under the Convention not to take life, but also the positive obligations to protect and support life, the pregnant woman, and family life.

The only way for the Court to conclude that abortion on demand would not violate the Convention would be to renounce the application of the Convention to the unborn child. Declaring that the Convention ignores the reality of the unborn child would also be renouncing the protection of the various public interests involved. For that the Court would have to transform the blind spot into a legal gap. However, until now, the Court has exercised its jurisdiction on abortion and refused to ignore the unborn child.

212 A., B. & C. v. Ireland, supra note 5 at para. 214.
People may think that abortion on demand is acceptable under the Convention because the Convention does not oppose abortion when there are health and life reasons. However, only those abortions for health or life reasons can be justified as pursuing a legitimate interest guaranteed by the Convention, so abortion on demand does not fall in the same category. Meanwhile, it is true that once the life of the unborn child has already been sacrificed for the protection of some other interests, it has become impossible to determine the value of this life in a non-arbitrary manner. The only way to have a clear-cut threshold and not to undermine the value of life would be to accept that the right to life of the unborn child can only be balanced with the equal right to life of his/her mother. Any other balance has an arbitrary component and it is ultimately the manifestation of the power of the strong over the weak, of the domination of the born over the not-yet-born. One can say that it has its own legitimacy, but this legitimacy is only one of violence, even if we call this violence freedom; it should not be covered up with the legitimacy of human rights.

Possibly, a father or grand-parent of an unborn child will one day complain before the Court in order to save the life of their child. All that a father or grand-parent would have to do is fax a letter to the Court under article 39 of the Rules of the Court, requesting it to take urgent and interim measures in order to avoid the realisation of a serious and imminent risk of breach of a fundamental right. The Court has already applied article 39 of the Rules in order to save in vitro embryos from destruction: in Knecht v. Romania, the applicant alleged a violation of her right to private and family life with regard to frozen embryos she had previously conceived in order to have a child by means of I.V.F. Four days after her request, the E.C.H.R. indicated to the Romanian Government that “in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court … under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, that the embryos should not be destroyed … for the duration of the proceedings before the Court” (§ 19). Therefore, the Court could also order, under article 39, that the in utero embryo or fetus should not be destroyed until it assessed the compatibility with the Convention of this abortion.

214 Proportionality is another matter.
215 Knecht v. Romania, no. 10048/10, 2 October 2012.
All the father or grand-parent of an unborn child would have to do is to request that the rights to life (Art. 2) and to physical integrity and dignity (Art. 3) of their unborn child or grand-child be preserved, and that their right to family life (Art. 8) be protected. The relatives of the unborn child could potentially obtain from the Court an order to suspend the procedure of abortion, if they demonstrate that this abortion is not justified by proportionate motives guaranteed by the Convention; they may also inform the Court that they are ready to rear the child. This procedure has never been used yet, but it could be effective. It would be consistent with the original meaning of the Convention and with the Court’s own case-law.

VII – Conclusion: the necessary implementation of the woman’s “right not to abort”

Neither the Convention, nor the Court when interpreting the Convention, excludes prenatal life from the scope of the protection of the Convention, which contains a right to life and not a right to abortion. In most European States, abortion is a derogation from the right to life. If a State decides to allow abortion, the Court points out that the State is obliged to protect and respect competing rights and interests. Therefore, a State that decides to permit abortion not only has an obligation to frame access to abortion, but it should also to take positive measures to avoid recourse to abortion. It must, therefore, fully respect its positive obligations stemming from the right to life and the other legitimate rights and interests.

In many cases, abortion is chosen because the mother or the parents do not have the means to rear the child. However, the State has the duty to protect life and the duty to promote economic and social rights. As 75% of abortions are caused by economic constraints, it is obvious that this matter should also be considered under the scope of socio-economic rights. The practice of abortion caused by economic and social pressure

\[216\] See L. C. B. v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 June 1998, no. 29413/94 at para. 36: “the Court considers that the first sentence of Article 2 para. 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.” cf. the Court’s reasoning in respect of Article 8 in the Guerra & Others v. Italy Judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I at para. 36, and see also the decision of the Commission on the admissibility of application no. 7154/75 of 12 July 1978, Decisions and Reports 14 at 31.
contradicts various provisions of the European Social Charter (E.S.C.) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (I.C.E.S.C.R.), such as its Article 10 recognising that: “[s]pecial protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth” (Article 10 § 2) and that “[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society”. Similarly, when someone aborts a child for economic reasons, it is obvious that the State has failed to respect “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family” guaranteed by the E.S.C. and the I.C.E.S.C.R. A woman who is forced to abort her child because she has financial difficulties, housing problems, or because her partner is violent, is a victim. In these cases, not only has the right to life of her baby been violated, but she has also endured the suffering and the degrading practice of abortion. She is a victim of the State’s breach of its socio-economic obligations. The State does not fulfil its obligations when its only real answer to the mother’s financial and social difficulties is to offer her an abortion.

The State is under a legal and positive obligation to provide the best possible circumstances so that women are not coerced to abort for social and economic reasons. In many cases, information would be sufficient for the mother to know her real choices in order to keep her baby or to let him/her live. The State should inform the mother of existing ways of getting the help she needs, such as financial, material and moral aid (e.g. houses for pregnant mothers in distress, subsidised day-care, the possibility of giving the child up for adoption, N.G.O.s catering for mothers and children, etc.). In some countries, like Latvia\textsuperscript{217} and France,\textsuperscript{218} the State renounced the systematic pre-abortion consultation in order to respect the “freedom of choice” of women. In this way, women are deprived of the information on alternatives to abortion (e.g. adoption, various available supports for pregnant women like shelter houses, crisis centres, etc.).

\textsuperscript{218} In France, such information was provided until 2001, when it was suppressed together with the preliminary consultation on the pretence that it infringed the right to abortion of the mother or would make her feel guilty.
financial support, *etc.* Such legislation is likely to violate the European Social Charter.

In other words, the State should implement the “woman’s right not to choose abortion”. This is consistent with the International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action which called on Governments to “take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning”.\(^{220}\) As Mrs. Gisela Wurm, Rapporteur of the P.A.C.E. Resolution on Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe recognised: “[a]bortion must, as far as possible, be avoided”.\(^{221}\) It is unfortunate to note that, speaking of the women’s right to choose; many efforts are made to promote a “human right to abortion”, whereas very few care about women’s “right not to abort”. Abortion is not a human right, whereas, the protection of life, dignity, physical integrity and family are authentic human rights.

Despite the fact that abortion has been considered an absolute right in the United States since the *Roe v. Wade* judgment in 1973,\(^{222}\) a growing number of American States are progressively restricting access to abortion (*e.g.* limiting the time limit of access) and are taking measures to permit the enjoyment of the “right not to abort”, by introducing social support, compulsory pre-abortion consultations, implementing a reflection period, *etc.* Also in Europe, some countries with a very high abortion rate and a catastrophic demography, like Hungary, are now willing to raise the degree of protection of the unborn child. An example is Article II of the recent Hungarian Constitution on human dignity and the right to life which states that “embryonic and foetal life shall be subject to protection from the moment of conception”.\(^{223}\) This is in line with the Preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the

\(^{219}\) In regard to the issue of information on abortion, the Court has only established for the moment that the State may not oppose the diffusion of information favourable to abortion. See *Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v Ireland*, no. 14234/88, 29 October 1992; see also *Women on Waves & Others v. Portugal*, no. 31276/05, 3 February 2009.


\(^{221}\) *Explanatory memorandum* by Mrs Gisela Wurm, Rapporteur at para. 31.


\(^{223}\) Section 3 of Act CCXI of 2011 on the Protection of Families repeats this statement.
Child which, quoting the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, recalls that “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”.