Impossible Floodgates and Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate

Fiona de Londras* & Laura Graham**

Twenty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Attorney General v X. [1992] 1 I.R. 1 confirmed that there is a limited constitutional right to access abortion in Ireland under Article 40.3.3˚ of Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Irish government has passed the first piece of legislation that would regulate its availability. The debate about the introduction and form of this legislation is rife with floodgate arguments, suggesting (either implicitly or expressly) that the introduction of abortion legislation within current constitutional boundaries would only be a starting point, following which so-called “abortion on demand” would flow. In this article we address three of the core legally-grounded floodgate arguments that are made, outlining how these fears are unfounded, disingenuous, and, more particularly, how comparisons to the British abortion regime are unhelpful, by reference to the constitutional position in Ireland. These arguments relate to: the lack of a time limit on the availability of abortion; suicidal ideation; and the possibility of patient-doctor collusion. This article aims to show that these arguments have no current legal purchase within the Irish context. Rather, the fears and concerns represented by these floodgates arguments are already managed by the very limited constitutional availability of abortion in Ireland. As such, we argue, these arguments ought not to be given undue weight in the debates, which should instead focus on introducing a clear, workable and effective legislative framework for women in Ireland to exercise their right to access an abortion where they wish to do so in a manner that reflects the constitutional position.

I – Introduction

The debate about the introduction and form of abortion legislation in Ireland is rife with floodgate arguments, suggesting (either implicitly or expressly) that the introduction of abortion legislation within current constitutional boundaries would only be a starting point, following which so-called “abortion on demand” would flow. The recent discussions at the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children showed little prospect of a break from this pattern. At those hearings, a number of parliamentarians asked repeatedly whether the introduction of limited abortion pursuant to the current constitutional position would result in widely available

* Professor & Co-Director of Durham Human Rights Centre, Durham Law School. Any correspondence in relation to this article should be directed to fiona.de-londras@durham.ac.uk
** Lecturer & Co-Director of Gender and Law at Durham (G.L.A.D.), Durham Law School.
abortion.\textsuperscript{1} Then – as often happens in Irish abortion discourse – the abortion regime operating under the British \textit{Abortion Act 1967}\textsuperscript{2} was expressly referred to as an example of a possible “end point” for Irish abortion law.

In this article we address three of the core legally-grounded floodgates arguments that are made, outlining how these fears are unfounded, disingenuous, and, more particularly, how comparisons to the British abortion regime are unhelpful, by reference to the constitutional position in Ireland. These arguments relate to: the lack of a time limit on the availability of abortion; suicidal ideation; and the possibility of patient-doctor collusion. This paper aims to show that these arguments have no current legal purchase within the Irish context and ought not to be given undue weight in the debates. Rather, the fears and concerns represented by these floodgates arguments are already managed by the very limited constitutional availability of abortion. As a result, they ought not be brought to bear in any meaningful way on the current process of legislative design which should instead be committed to introducing a clear, workable and effective legislative framework for women in Ireland to exercise their right to access an abortion where they wish to do so in a manner that reflects the constitutional position.\textsuperscript{3}

\section*{II – Floodgates Arguments}

Lawyers are no strangers to floodgates arguments, also sometimes known as slippery slope arguments. As a rhetorical tool, floodgate arguments are usually deployed to put in the mind of the decision-maker the potential long-term implications of a decision in place of the merits of the decision based on the case and evidence before her.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} The transcript of the three-day Committee hearing in January 2013 is available at: <http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeedatelist?readform&year=2013&code=HE> (date accessed: 12 April 2013) [hereinafter Joint Committee on Health and Children].
\item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Abortion Act 1967} (U.K.), s. 1(1)(a) as am. by \textit{Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990} [hereinafter \textit{1967 Act}]. The authors note that rather than being a U.K.-wide statute, this statute is only in force in England, Scotland, and Wales. The provisions of the Act were never extended to Northern Ireland (as stated in s. 7(3)) and as such we will refer to this statute as the British law on abortion.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Although both authors would support a constitutional change to permit the broader availability of abortion, no such argument is made here; rather this paper concentrates on the process of giving effect to the current constitutional provisions.
\end{itemize}
As Frederick Schauer has written, where such arguments are deployed, “the single argumentative claim supported by each of these metaphors, as well as by many others, is that a particular act, seemingly innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly pernicious events.” Although floodgates arguments do not tend to meet with much success in litigation as a general matter, they may have more purchase in a political context and particularly where the matter at hand is a deeply politicised and difficult one, as abortion is in the Irish context. Here, the decision-makers are politicians, torn – as politicians almost inevitably are – between personal conviction, party discipline and voter sentiment. In such a febrile environment, floodgates arguments may have more prospect of success and they have been much in evidence in the debate on abortion legislation in Ireland so far. By means of example, we can refer to the oral submissions to the Joint Committee on Health and Children in January of this year, where a number of floodgates claims were made.

In her evidence, Professor Patricia Casey (Professor of Psychiatry, clinical psychiatrist, and patron of the Iona Institute for Religion and Society) stated that legislation “may not open the flood-gates immediately but there will certainly be widespread abortion within a short period of time” and that “there will be a gradual attempt to extend the law.” In his evidence Professor William Binchy (Professor Emeritus of law, barrister and legal adviser to the Pro Life Campaign) stated:

if we change the practice in Irish hospitals so that obstetricians are carrying out abortions on women who have no physical illness whatsoever and on unborn children who have no physical difficulty whatsoever on the basis of suicidal ideation, we very definitely will have changed the principles on which medical practice operates in this country… . Any person of a humane disposition feels tremendously for the circumstances of the pregnant woman, and if one feels tremendously for a particular pregnant woman and agrees that one can take an innocent life in circumstances in which there is no medical condition, then I would respectfully say the principles have been changed and the culture will have been changed for the future … . Not tomorrow or the next day but over a period of time that would have an effect on medical practice in this area such that the attitude towards abortion would be transformed. It is reasonable to project

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5 Prof. Patricia Casey, Oral Evidence to Joint Committee on Health and Children, supra note 1 on 8 January 2013.
that the net effect would be that the actual interpretations of the grounds would change over time.\(^6\)

In similar fashion, in her opening oral statement Caroline Simons from the Pro Life Campaign claimed that if abortion legislation were introduced:

> [s]ociety would perceive that the right to life of the unborn is not that important and we are not really serious about protecting it . . . . After a time, this would become received wisdom and that would be the end of the culture of life and the beginning of the culture of abortion. If one surrenders the principle of the right to life of the unborn, that sends a message to society which, in turn, produces a cultural change. Then other cultural questions emerge. What other rights will one overwhelm when their subjects are not very important? Some people refer to this as the slippery slope argument. Whatever one calls it, it is certain that ideas such as these have real consequences.\(^7\)

These claims are classical – and in some cases, essentially, express – floodgates arguments: they are intended to provoke decision-makers (in this case, legislators) into considering possibilities that are either remote or constitutionally impossible in an attempt to influence the outcome of the process. They are also generalised – intended to make legislators think about “general” implications of introducing any abortion legislation at all. In addition to these more general arguments, anti-abortion advocates also make floodgate arguments that are directed attempts to influence the content of legislation, particularly in relation to time limits, suicidal ideation, and the processes for accessing abortion more generally. In each case, we argue, both the constitutional status quo and the comparative experience from other jurisdictions (and especially from Britain) signal the disingenuity of floodgate arguments in the Irish abortion debate. This is particularly so, we argue, where the British experience under the 1967 Act is represented as both deeply problematic and as indicative of the likely outcome from abortion legislation in Ireland.

A. The Constitutional Position

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, introduced in 1983, inserted Article 40.3.3 into Bunreacht na hÉireann in order for it to provide: “\(^6\) The State

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\(^6\) Prof. William Binchy, ibid. on 9 January 2013.

\(^7\) Caroline Simons, ibid. on 10 January 2013.
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” Although this provision was intended to foreclose any possibility of a right to access an abortion being read into the Constitution in a manner analogous to that done in the United States decision of *Roe v. Wade*, the wording was problematic from the start. State papers recently released reveal that a number of successive Attorneys General expressed serious concerns about the ways in which the provision might be interpreted. Although proposed by anti-abortion lobby groups, the literal interpretation of the provision clearly permitted abortion in at least some circumstances, namely where the life of the woman was at risk. This kind of abortion is consistent with most anti-abortion campaigners’ conception of what kinds of interventions ought to be permitted in law, although the term abortion is not usually used to describe these procedures particularly in Catholic thought; rather, these are described as lifesaving interventions. The difference in terminology refers to perceived intention (killing a foetus (abortion) v. saving the woman (lifesaving intervention)), however such moral distinctions were not clearly expressed in the provision itself, even if they were intended by the proposers and many of those who voted for the provision.

As a result, the possibility that Article 40.3.3° might permit abortion outside of emergency situations (which were primarily contemplated), albeit still in the limited circumstances of there being a threat to the life of the woman, remained real. It was not, however, until the landmark decision in *A.G. v. X.* that the full extent of that possibility began to become clear.

The *X.* case concerned a fourteen year-old girl who had become pregnant as a result of rape. Before travelling to the U.K. to have an abortion, the girl’s parents contacted the gardaí to ask whether D.N.A. evidence from the aborted foetus might be admissible in a trial of her rapist. Following on from this, a sequence of events took place that led to the Attorney General seeking an injunction to prevent her from

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8 *Roe v. Wade* (1973) 410 U.S. 113 [hereinafter *Roe*].
10 For a critique of this, see in this edition: S. Glackin & S. Mills, “Termination of Pregnancy, Article 40.3.3°, and the Law of Intended Consequences” [2013] 3(3) I.J.L.S. 76.
travelling in order to uphold the right to life of the unborn as expressed in the Constitution. Although the High Court did enjoin X from travelling, the Supreme Court did not; rather the Supreme Court outlined in more detail than had previously been the case the parameters of Article 40.3.3°. In this respect, the Court held that as the article protects the right to life of pregnant women and foetuses equally there would be some cases where intervention to bring a pregnancy to an end would be constitutionally permissible. These situations were narrowly constrained indeed – as required by the wording of Article 40.3.3° – and were limited to circumstances where, as Mr. Chief Justice Finlay put it, “... it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy.” Of particular controversy is the fact that the Court included a risk of suicide as a risk to the life of the mother that could give rise to constitutionally permissible intervention, including abortion. This dictum in the X. case remains the definitive interpretation of the meaning of the relevant constitutional text; the interpretation has never been overturned by the Court or by the People in a constitutional referendum. This case makes it clear that – limited as it is – there is a space within which abortion is constitutionally permissible in Ireland; it is within that modest space that current legislative activity takes place.

The purpose of this short account is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the constitutional position, which is provided at length elsewhere, but rather to make it clear that the current legislative process is entirely bounded by this constitutional position. These clear constitutional boundaries ought to be considered the limits of possibility in terms of what legislation can do and, simultaneously, the limits of risk for those who are anxious about the possibility of “abortion on demand”. Quite simply, any legislation that attempted to introduce abortion in a manner that allowed for broader grounds of abortion than “real and substantial risk to the mother”, or in a manner that does not ensure the instigation of processes intended to maintain the respect for both the pregnant woman and the foetus that Article 40.3.3° makes express, would be

12 Ibid. at 53-54.
13 See generally, J. Schwerppe, ed., The Unborn Child, Article 40.3.3 and Abortion in Ireland: Twenty-Five Years of Protection? (Dublin; Liffey Press, 2008). See too the other articles in this special edition.
constitutionally impermissible and resultantly invalid. It is this that marks the floodgate arguments frequently made in this context as unfounded; indeed, the provisions of the *Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013* (as initiated) affirm that this is the case. A consideration of these floodgate arguments in turn reinforces this.

**B. Time Limits**

A recurrent claim made in criticism of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 40.3.3° is that the provision does not limit the right to access an abortion by reference to time limits. Based on the lack of an express time limit, the claim is made that the X. case interpretation gives Ireland unusually wide abortion availability. This is a classic floodgates argument, intended to suggest that legislating to give effect to the X. case would somehow involve Ireland in bringing into law an uncommonly liberal abortion regime, where late term (or “partial birth”) abortions would be constitutionally sanctioned. We dispute this claim on two levels: the first is to say that even if life-saving abortion were permitted into late stages of the pregnancy this would not make Ireland an outlier among states that permit abortion where the life of the pregnant woman is at stake; the second is to note that the mutual respect outlined in the Constitution clearly prohibits abortion where a foetus is (or may be) viable. As such, this argument is particularly disingenuous.

First, time limits in abortion legislation are almost always applied in relation to abortions that are available relatively widely rather than abortion that is limited by extreme risks to the life of the pregnant woman. The 1967 Act in Britain, for example, only imposes a 24-week limit upon those abortions performed under the widest provision of that statute – where “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or injury to the physical or mental

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14 *Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013* [hereinafter 2013 Bill]. Section 1 makes it clear that medical professionals must make decisions under the Bill “in good faith [having regard] to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable” and in all cases a termination is permissible only when the required number of practitioners consider in good faith that “there is a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s life…and in their reasonable opinion, that risk can only be averted” by a procedure that ends unborn human life (see ss. 7, 8, 9).
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family.” The other three narrower grounds – including where there is risk to the life of the pregnant woman – include no such time limit. In most States in which abortion is permitted to save the life of the mother (which is, in fact, the vast majority of the world’s countries), abortion is permitted quite late into the pregnancy or, in fact, not subject to any time limit whatsoever. Thus, permitting life-saving abortion without a time limit would not make Ireland a significant outlier in the international legal landscape.

It is appropriate also to note that the inclusion of a time limit in the restrictive circumstances in which abortion is permissible in Ireland would be intellectually incongruent with an approach grounded in an anti-abortion position, as the Irish constitutional position is. Time limits are usually imposed to indicate that there is a stage of foetal development at which the relevant legal system determines that an abortion should be possible only for grave reasons of health and welfare of the pregnant woman but that before that abortion might be more widely available; it might even be “on demand” as the phrase goes. The Irish system is simply fundamentally different: we do not need a time limit to be imposed on abortion (nor would such a time limit be appropriate or, arguably, constitutionally acceptable) because our constitutional situation deems that there is never a stage in foetal development where abortion is acceptable for anything but the most grave reason, i.e. to avert a real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman. Thus analogies to other – more liberal – abortion regimes are unhelpful in this context.

Does this mean that viable foetuses can be aborted in Ireland in these grave circumstances? The clear answer is “no” and it is to be found in the text of the Constitution itself. Again, in this context the Irish system is not comparable to systems such as those found in the United Kingdom. The reason for this is the constitutional protection for the life of the unborn child, which is given equal esteem to the life of the pregnant woman. Thus, while a pregnant woman who is subject to a real and

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15 1967 Act, supra note 2, s. 1(1)(a).
16 Ibid., s. 1(1)(c).
17 Our consideration of abortion law around the world suggests that life-saving abortion is prohibited only in Chile, El Salvador, Malta, Nicaragua and Vatican City.
substantial risk of death that, on the balance of probabilities, can only be averted through termination of the pregnancy has a right to life that permits termination, the unborn child has an equal right to life. The practical implication of this is that where a foetus is viable or on the cusp of viability a woman may have a constitutional right to have her pregnancy brought to an end, but that does not mean that she has a right to an abortion understood as a procedure done with the intention of bringing foetal life to an end. Instead, an early delivery would be the means by which we would attempt to give effect to the rights to life of the pregnant woman and of the foetus. Rather than being determined by a time limit, the decision between an abortion and an early delivery is essentially one of medical judgment as to the viability of the foetus. This approach, which arguably provides greater protection to the right to life of the unborn than does a time limit, is of course entirely consistent with the anti-abortion tenor of Article 40.3.3° itself.

The foregoing paragraphs make it quite clear that arguments around time limits in Ireland are classic floodgates arguments, intended to detract from the fact that the Constitution already deals with the matter of time. It is the case, of course, that the Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court in the X. case does not deal with the question of time limits in a neat, chronological way; there is no clear 24-week limit, for example. Rather it deals with time in a manner that is entirely appropriate to a highly restrictive abortion regime in which abortion is permissible only in truly exceptional circumstances where there is both a risk to the life of the mother and an unviable foetus. These are factual matters to be determined by medical examination and judgement; they are not easily amenable to the neat and simplistic type of test so often preferred by law. To put a time limit in place would, we contend, be entirely inappropriate because whether an abortion is constitutionally permissible in any particular case is, quite simply, determined by the circumstances of that case. In some cases, a foetus at 22-weeks may be viable making early delivery the constitutionally acceptable pathway towards terminating the pregnancy; in other cases the foetus might not be viable, and abortion may be permissible. Talk of time limits belongs in a more liberal abortion regime; it is neither appropriate to nor required in as highly restrictive a regime as Ireland’s.
C. Suicidal Ideation

The availability of abortion under the Constitution in a case where the risk to the life of the pregnant woman emanates from suicidal ideation is a particularly controversial element of the Irish constitutional landscape. A variety of arguments are made in this respect, but two are of particular relevance in the context of floodgates. The first is that abortion is not a “cure” for suicidal ideation, and ought therefore never to be considered a mechanism by which the real and substantial threat to the life of the pregnant woman can be averted under the X. case test. The second is that suicidal ideation will or may become a “gateway” for widespread abortion availability in Ireland. In both cases, we contend, these arguments do not provide any legally justifiable basis for omitting suicidal ideation from the legislative scheme when it is clearly and expressly part of the constitutional scheme pursuant to the X. case. Although this was the first time there was a clear acknowledgement that suicidality came within the exceptional permission of Article 40.3.3°, suicidal ideation is clearly a risk to the life of a pregnant woman that ought to be included under the terms of the provision. The Constitution makes no distinction between different sources of risk to the life of the mother, although the X. case makes it very clear that the risk must be grave indeed – a real and substantial risk the aversion of which can in all likelihood be achieved only through termination of the pregnancy – before it can trigger a constitutional permission to have an abortion. Based on this there seems to be no basis for distinguishing in legislation between different types of risk to the life of the pregnant woman.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, in other jurisdictions it is quite common to refer simply to risks to the life of a pregnant woman or to refer to mental health grounds for an abortion without specifying suicide or suicidal ideation.\textsuperscript{19}

The concern in Ireland appears to be that, in some way, suicidality is a different kind of risk to the life of the pregnant woman; one that can be managed without


\textsuperscript{19} This is the case under the 1967 Act, supra note 2, which, under s. 1(1)(c) provides for abortion where “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated.” It also provides for abortion in cases of “injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman”; s. 1(1)(a) and s. 1(1)(b).
terminating the pregnancy. In this respect the evidence of Professor Patricia Casey to the Joint Committee on Health and Children is of particular interest. Professor Casey claimed that there is no evidence for the claim that abortion reduces the risk of suicide in pregnancy; in fact, she claimed that suicidality in pregnancy may be linked to a number of other factors (including mental illness or pressure from partners of families to have an unwanted abortion), and that, in all of her years in practice, she had never seen a suicidal pregnant woman for whom abortion was the only treatment. It is not our aim here to claim that Professor Casey is wrong in these claims; indeed, as a consultant psychiatrist she is in a far better position to determine the relationship between suicidality and pregnancy in any particular case than lawyers would be. That said, the claims made in this evidence are floodgates arguments because they are intended to persuade legislators to omit from the legislative provision for abortion something that is included in the constitutional scheme, based on an attempt to generalise from personal experience. Indeed, it may well be the case that there will be no – or a very rare few – cases of pregnant women who present as suffering from a real and substantial risk to their lives based on suicidality where that risk can only be averted by termination of the pregnancy and where, because the foetus is not viable, that termination would take place by abortion. The frequency with which this might occur is, quite simply, not at issue. What is at issue is the continuing mismatch between the constitutional provision (allowing of abortion here) and the legislative vacuum in relation to same. It is quite clear that unless all of the elements of the legal test are fulfilled (i.e. there is a real and substantial risk + in probability it is capable of being averted by termination only + foetus is not viable) no abortion would be constitutionally permissible. General claims as to how frequently such a patient might present to a medical professional or how suitable abortion might be as a “treatment” for suicidality are quite clearly intended to distort consideration of the core question for legislators, i.e. “how shall we give effect to the suicide provision in law?” (rather than “shall we give effect to the suicide provision in law at all?”).

A further floodgates argument that is inferred, rather than often expressly made, is that suicidal ideation might be “faked” by women who wish to acquire an abortion in

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20 Joint Committee on Health and Children, supra note 1 on 8 January 2013.
Ireland. These views are problematic on a number of levels. First, the suggestion that women would pretend to be suicidal and present as suicidal to the medical services in order to acquire an abortion is offensive to women, to people who do experience suicidal ideation, and to medical professionals. Secondly, the claims that suicidal ideation in pregnancy can be managed without a termination ignore the fact that where, as a matter of medical judgement, it is found that a woman is experiencing suicidal ideation, this will give rise to constitutional permission to terminate the pregnancy only where such termination is, on the basis of probability, the only way to avert the risk to the pregnant woman’s life. In other words, the very strict and limited structure of the constitutional test continues to operate to limit the availability of abortion in these circumstances.

Thus, the perceived floodgates in relation to suicidal ideation are easily addressed by reference (i) to the general practice in comparative jurisdictions of dealing with suicidal ideation under the same terms as other risks to life in abortion legislation, and (ii) to the strictness of the Irish constitutional test, which treats of all risks to the life of the pregnant woman the same, whether they emanate from suicidality or from a physical illness. Floodgates concerns as to suicidality should, in any case, be allayed by the terms of the 2013 Bill (as initiated) itself. Section 9 of the 2013 Bill provides that an abortion would be available to a woman where three practitioners (an obstetrician and two psychiatrists\textsuperscript{21}) certify jointly and in good faith that there is a real and substantial risk to her life by means of suicide and that their reasonable opinion is that this can only be averted by a medical procedure bringing about the end of unborn life (the chosen euphemism for abortion in the 2013 Bill\textsuperscript{22}). This is a demonstrably more rigorous process than that applied where there is a risk emanating from physical illness (in which case two practitioners must thus certify\textsuperscript{23}), in spite of the fact that there is no clear legal justification for such a differentiation in treatment of risks.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] 2013 Bill, supra note 14, s. 9(2).
\item[22] Ibid., s. 9(1).
\item[23] See generally s. 8, ibid.
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D. Patient-Doctor Collusion

One of the realities of a medicalised system of determining whether or not a woman has access to an abortion is that, in order for it to operate along the intended lines, medical professionals involved in the administration of the legal regime must act in good faith. In the context of the contemporary debate in Ireland, there are both explicit and implicit suggestions that some anti-abortion advocates believe that patient-doctor collusion will take place. This is in spite of the fact that—in addition to their normal ethical obligations—when making certification decisions under the 2013 Bill, medical professionals are statutorily obliged to take into account the “need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable” (section 1), and that it is a serious criminal offence to provide an abortion outside of the strict permissions contained within the statutory framework (section 22(4)).

The explicit suggestion relates to the sometimes-made analogy to the involvement of medical professionals in determining whether someone is entitled to access a legal abortion under the U.K. 1967 Act, which is considered to be permissive and open to collusion. Yet, under this statute, two doctors must agree in good faith that one of the four legal grounds for abortion applies. This requirement reduces the possibility of patient-doctor collusion as both doctors must be satisfied that an abortion would be legal. There is an exception to the two-doctor rule, however, if a doctor is of the opinion that a termination is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman. This allows doctors to make emergency decisions where there may not be time for consultation with another medical practitioner, yet, given that it only applies where the termination is immediately necessary, the potential for patient-doctor collusion is minimal. As such, this exception is unlikely to create a loophole whereby doctors will decide unanimously to perform an abortion outside of the legal grounds.

\footnotetext{24} This is discussed in further detail below.\footnotetext{25} 1967 Act, supra note 2, s. 1(1).\footnotetext{26} Ibid., s. 1(4).
In all other non-emergency circumstances, a second doctor’s agreement is required. Although the second doctor is not required to meet or examine the pregnant woman, she must be convinced through assessment of the necessary clinical information about the patient’s case that one of the legal grounds for abortion applies. Both doctors must then complete a H.S.A.1 form to certify that this is the case. Before the Joint Committee on Health and Children it was suggested that this process is routinely circumvented by doctors and does not act as a “safeguard” to ensure that abortion takes place only within the permitted grounds under the 1967 Act. It is correct to say that concern has been raised that some doctors have been pre-stamping and pre-signing H.S.A.1 forms in order to certify abortions without reviewing the relevant notes, essentially leaving the decision to be made by one doctor. However, where this practice has been uncovered in Britain, there have been threats of criminal sanctions and steps have now been taken to ensure compliance with the law. Moreover, even if this practice exists, it does not necessarily translate to “abortion on demand” as the first doctor must still have agreed that the legal grounds applied in order to certify the legality of the abortion. Rather it appears that this practice reflects an ever-growing dissatisfaction among the medical profession with the legal requirement for two doctors’ signatures, and a belief that individual doctors are fully able to make an accurate and faithful assessment without consulting another doctor. There is also evidence to


28 Dr. Seán O’Domhnaill, Oral Evidence to Joint Committee on Health and Children, supra note 1 on 10 January 2013. When responding to questions from Committee members, said:

I can quickly tell the committee about my experience in Jersey in 1997 when the abortion Act was extended there. One of my consultant colleagues there had a stack of leaflets at the side of her desk all pre-stamped. All that was required was the name of the patient. We know from investigations in Britain going back as far as 1974 that this has been repeatedly shown to be the case. The Sunday Telegraph has done undercover investigations which have also shown this. It is something we need to worry about.

29 In a series of inspections by the Care Quality Commission, evidence was found of this practice being used in fourteen National Health Service trusts. They have since stopped this practice, and continue to have internal audits and staff training to ensure compliance with the law. More information is available at: <http://www.cqc.org.uk/media/findings-termination-pregnancy-inspections-published> (date accessed: 12 February 2013).

suggest that rather than a universally permissive approach from doctors in Britain, practice is in fact widely variable, due in part to the broad range of factors that legally are to be taken into account by the physicians. Specifically, when making an assessment regarding the widest ground for abortion under section 1(1)(a) (that the pregnancy has not exceeded its 24th-week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family), doctors must take into account the pregnant woman’s “actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.” This allows the doctor to scrutinise her whole lifestyle, home and relationships “so that he may decide if she is deserving of relief.” While this does provide for consideration of non-medical factors, a decision to allow an abortion must still be based on the risk or injury of the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or her children in light of those factors. As such, this does not permit doctors to perform abortions on demand for purely social reasons. However, it does provide scope for doctors to base a decision not to give permission for an abortion on non-clinical reasons and prejudice, as rejection is the default position. Thus, a more complete picture of practice in Britain sheds a somewhat different light on this concern about medical professionals circumventing the legislative provisions. Furthermore – as we explore below – it is our view that the particular restrictiveness of the legal test in Ireland is such that comparable practice would not in fact emerge.

To expand further on the concerns raised and claims about practitioner behaviour relating to abortion legislation, it is important to note that under the 1967 Act doctors are not under a duty “to participate in any treatment… to which he has a conscientious objection,” except where the treatment is “necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.” The case law on conscientious objection has not clarified whether this includes a refusal to certify that a pregnant woman has satisfied the legal grounds for

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31 1967 Act, supra note 2, section 1(2).
32 S. Sheldon, “‘Who is the Mother to Make the Judgment?’ Constructions of Woman in English Abortion Law” (1993) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 3 at 18.
33 1967 Act, supra note 2, s. 4 (1).
34 Ibid., s. 4 (2).
abortion. Nor are doctors under any duty to declare that their reason for refusal is based on conscientious objection. Taken together, pregnant women might be refused an abortion based on conscience grounds but be given the impression that they objectively do not satisfy the legal grounds for abortion. This can particularly affect women with little knowledge of English or the law on abortion. While there have been suggestions that doctors are under at least an ethical duty to refer a patient where they conscientiously object, some objecting doctors have been known to “refuse to refer patients to non-objecting doctors, to refuse to sign abortion-related paperwork, to tell women to take a few weeks to ‘think about it’ before they discuss abortion refusal, or to ask patients to read the Bible.” These refusals signify quite the opposite of patient-doctor collusion and, in fact, cause delays in accessing abortion services, often affecting some of the most vulnerable pregnant women. For instance, some women, particularly young women, do not find out they are pregnant until late in their gestational period, when they are nearing the 24 week limit for abortions falling under section 1(1)(a); teenage women might not see a doctor until late in the gestational period due to fear of their parents’ reactions; while women in domestically violent and controlling relationships may be unable to visit a doctor until late into their pregnancies. For these women, refusals to refer or lack of transparency in the reasons for which a termination is refused can delay the procedure beyond the legal limit for the broadest ground of legal abortion.


Thus, the picture from Britain is decidedly more mixed than many anti-abortion advocates in Ireland suggest. Although there does appear to be some evidence of doctors in Britain taking less seriously than might have been desired the requirements to have consent from two doctors for an abortion, we are not convinced that this is likely to arise to any significant extent in the Irish context. This is primarily because the standard for accessing abortion will be considerably different under the Irish legislation than it is in Britain. Unlike in that jurisdiction, medical professionals in Ireland will have to be convinced – as already noted – that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother that can only be averted through abortion,\(^{42}\) and that the foetus is not viable. Not only is this a much higher standard than applicable in the case of abortion up to 24-weeks in Britain, but it is also considerably higher than the standard applied for abortions after that period of time. After this limit, the British law still permits abortion not only on the grounds that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve “risk to the life of the pregnant women greater than if the pregnancy were terminated”,\(^{43}\) but also to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman,\(^{44}\) or if there is a substantial risk that the child would be born seriously handicapped.\(^{45}\) The 2013 Bill (as initiated) usually requires a minimum of two doctors (emergencies are the exception) to certify that there is a risk to life of the kind that would permit an abortion,\(^{46}\) and these procedures will be carried out only in certified hospital locations.\(^{47}\) The contexts in which the decisions will take place are thus vastly different to G.P. surgeries, not least because of the onerous ethics requirements within hospital settings and the reporting requirements within the 2013 Bill.\(^{48}\) Thus, this general concern that arises in some quarters about medical practitioners not taking sufficiently seriously their certification role strikes us as one that fails to take into account the considerably different context in which the Irish law would operate when compared with more permissive legal regimes.

\(^{42}\) We note that the 2013 Bill, supra note 14 does not at any point include the words “as a matter of probability” in the test for accessing an abortion, unlike the test laid down in the X. case, supra note 11.

\(^{43}\) 1967 Act, supra note 2, s. 1(1) (c).

\(^{44}\) Ibid., s. 1(1)(b).

\(^{45}\) Ibid., s. 1(1)(d).

\(^{46}\) 2013 Bill, supra note 14, ss. 7-9.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., s. 3. Every appropriate location listed in the Schedule to the Bill is a hospital.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., s. 20.
The implicit suggestion of doctor-patient collusion arises in relation to suicidal ideation and the demand for a different – by implication more onerous and difficult to satisfy – procedure to be applied in cases where it is claimed that the risk to the life of the pregnant woman arises from the risk of suicide. Although it rarely baldly stated, the demand for such a separated regime implies that women who are not in fact suicidal would be both likely and able to convince doctors to certify that they meet the constitutional threshold for termination of a pregnancy. This is both a more acute manifestation of the general suggestion relating to patient-doctor collusion (that doctors would not apply their clinical judgement with sufficient rigour) and a discomfiting commentary on our socio-political approach to suicidality, implying that it can be “faked” or that it is “merely” a mental health difficulty (in relation to which no right to access abortion arises) rather than a real and substantial risk to women’s lives (in which case the right to access abortion does arise). The logical end point of both the express and implied suggestions relating to client-patient collusion is that women would (falsely) claim to be suicidal, and medical practitioners would be both willing and able to accept that claim and adjudge that a termination of pregnancy would in probability be the only way to avert the risk to the woman’s life. In our view, both the realities of medical practice in situations of grave risk to life (which are the relevant comparator situations here, rather than general medical practice) and the extremely limited constitutional test for the availability of abortion in Ireland clearly illustrate the unlikelihood (if not constitutional impossibility) of this perceived floodgate materialising.

A further, and not unrelated, point of relevance here is that further safeguards against collusion can be introduced without compromising or making effectively illusory the right to access abortion, especially in the case of suicidality, by means of the criminal law. Section 5 of the 2013 Bill expressly repeals sections 58-59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (1861 Act) and replaces them with a new offence in section 22. It is in this way that the Irish government seems determined to give effect to its pledge in Article 40.3.3° to “guarantee in its laws to protect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate” the equal rights to life of pregnant women and the unborn. We acknowledge that, because of the terms of Article 40.3.3°, re-designating
abortion a criminal offence is likely necessary, but concerns about the offence as designed can clearly be raised.

In particular, it is important to consider whether it reproduces the “chilling effect” about which the European Court of Human Rights expressed concern in *A., B. & C. v. Ireland.* That chilling effect was produced not merely by criminalisation but also by the lack of a clear mechanism to determine whether or not one was permitted to administer an abortion in any given circumstance. It is important to note that there is now a clear process outlined in the 2013 Bill for ascertaining this, such that criminalising acts that “intentionally destroy unborn human life” (section 22(1)) does not in itself appear to be Convention-incompatible. So too is the clarification in section 22(4) that there is no criminal offence where a medical procedure that ends unborn human life is carried out in accordance with sections 7, 8 and 9 of the 2013 Bill a welcome “thaw” to the chilling effect. In this context the imposition of a heavy possible maximum penalty (up to 14 years imprisonment) in section 22(2) may not be Convention incompatible, although it seems particularly punitive in the case, for example, of the self-administration of abortifacients by a woman not entitled to an abortion under the Constitution but not possessed of the means to exercise her right to travel in order to access an abortion abroad. That punitiveness may, we contend, be ameliorated by context-and-circumstance-sensitive sentencing by courts and, it is to be hoped, by the judicious exercise of discretion by the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) when deciding whether or not to pursue a prosecution. Further concerns arise about whether Health Service Executive staff members might be obliged to refer to the D.P.P. patients who present for aftercare or with complications following self-administration of abortifacients or, perhaps more realistically, whether women in that situation would *apprehend* that this might happen and thus be dissuaded from seeking medical assistance. That would be a deeply troubling and perhaps unintended consequence of re-criminalisation.

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50 *2013 Bill*, supra note 14, s. 22(3). This subsection provides that prosecutions can only be brought for this offence by or with the consent of the Director.
That said, an approach whereby abortion remains generally criminalised but subject to permitted exceptions, is not unusual; indeed it is the approach adopted in Britain. In that jurisdiction, the 1967 Act, by creating four legal grounds for abortion, merely provides exceptions to an otherwise criminal act. In Britain, section 58 of the 1861 Act makes having or performing an abortion illegal, criminalising both the pregnant woman who has an (unlawful) abortion and the doctor (or other person) who carries out the (unlawful) abortion. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 further creates an offence of by a “wilful act” intentionally destroying of the life of a child capable of being born alive, with a women who is 28-weeks pregnant being prima facie assumed to be pregnant with a child capable of being born alive. All three offences have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and doctors may be struck off by the General Medical Council if they are found guilty of any of the three. Rather than Britain having abortion on demand, these offences are still used to punish abortions outside of the legal framework provided by the 1967 Act – in 2012, a woman was convicted under section 58 of the 1861 Act for administering herself an “abortion pill” with the purpose of procuring a miscarriage outside of the ambit of the 1967 Act. She was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.

III – Conclusions

Although, as we have seen, a number of the core floodgates arguments made in relation to drafting abortion legislation in Ireland are specific to particular matters and dismantled by reference to the clear and incredibly restrictive boundaries of the Constitution, there is one overarching floodgates argument that perhaps best explains all of these individual ones: an argument as to culture. We already noted the claim by Professor Binchy and by Caroline Simmons to the Joint Committee on Health and Children that introducing a legislative scheme for abortion will result in a change to the cultural approach to abortion in Ireland. In somewhat more colourful terms, a similar claim was made on Morning Ireland by Bishop Leo O'Reilly, who claimed that abortion

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51 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s. 1(1).
52 Ibid., s. 1(2).
legislation would usher in a “culture of death” in Ireland and “inevitably lead to the most liberal kind of abortion.”\footnote{Interview on \textit{Morning Ireland}, R.T.É. (7 January 2013).} Although this is a floodgates argument inasmuch as it is intended to distract decision-makers from the task at hand (giving effect to the current constitutional provision), it is one that is not so easily dismissed as the others considered above for it may well be true that, as abortion becomes legally available in Ireland, claims for \textit{more} availability might be made. Indeed, opinion polls (unreliable as these may be as markers of real public sentiment) suggest that this tide is already turning and, as we know, a large number of women leave Ireland for abortions every year;\footnote{It was reported recently that 3982 women gave Irish addresses for abortions in the U.K. in 2012; M. Minihan, “Almost 4000 woman went to UK for abortions in 2012” \textit{Irish Times} (11 July 2013).} two facts that call into question how anti-abortion Irish society currently is.

What this overarching floodgates claim fails to acknowledge, however, is that even if there were such a cultural change this could not result in a legal change without a constitutional amendment, which in turn can only be achieved by means of a referendum of the People.

In order to bring about legal change, then, a cultural change in attitude towards abortion would need to be capable of: (a) attracting sufficient political support to initiate a referendum in the first place; and (b) attracting sufficient popular support to succeed at the ballot box. Neither of these tasks is an easy one and, indeed, abortion referenda are notoriously fraught politico-legal events in Ireland. That said, Ireland’s constitutional culture is one in which popular sentiment around an issue that has attracted sufficient political support can, indeed, result in a constitutional change; that is the essence of a referendum system (albeit one without an initiative mechanism). Should such a change arise, it would, quite simply, be part of Irish constitutional evolution as, indeed, the Eighth Amendment giving rise to the current abortion regime was. It is not, or at least should not be, an argument against legal change to suggest possible future constitutional change in a country with a referendum based approach to popular constitutional sovereignty. To do so is to undermine in its entirety the structure of constitutional governance in the state and, rather paradoxically, the successful campaign for the Eighth Amendment run in the early 1980s. To allow this underlying concern with a possible cultural shift to distort the process of drafting the legislation
within the current constitutional framework would be even more egregious particularly since – as we have established – the discrete arguments into which this underlying claim is translated are decisively countered by the inescapable limitations of Article 40.3.3° itself.